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Volume I: Assessment Report
1.0 Authorization and Notification
The assessment was requested and approved out-of-board on March 5, 2007 by authority of the
Director, NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). The NESC team was chartered by the
NASA Office of Chief Engineer (OCE), and the Associate Administrator (AA) Space Operations
Mission Directorate (SOMD) to assess hail damage repair efforts on the Space Transportation
System (STS)-117 External Tank (ET)-124. Mr. Tim Wilson, Deputy Director NESC, was the
responsible lead for this assessment. The four key stakeholders for this investigation are Mr.
Wayne Hale, Space Shuttle Program (SSP) Manager at the Johnson Space Center in Houston,
Texas; Mr. Chris Scolese, NASA Chief Engineer at NASA’s Headquarters in Washington, D.C.;
Mr. William Gerstenmaier, AA SOMD at NASA’s Headquarters in Washington, D.C.; and Mr.
Bryan O’Connor, Chief Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Officer at NASA Headquarters
in Washington, D.C.
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4.0 Executive Summary
Severe thunderstorms with associated hail and high winds struck the STS-117 stack on February
26, 2007. Peak winds were recorded at 62 knots with hail sizes ranging from 0.3 inch to 0.8 inch
in diameter. As a result of the storm, the North Carolina Foam Institute (NCFI) type 24-124
Thermal Protection System (TPS) foam on the liquid oxygen (LO2) ogive acreage incurred
significant impact damage. The NCFI on the ET intertank and the liquid hydrogen (LH2) acreage
sustained hail damage. The Polymer Development Laboratory (PDL)-1034 foam of the LO2 ice
frost ramps (IFRs) and the Super-Lightweight Ablator (SLA) of the LO2 cable tray also suffered
minor damage.
NESC was asked to assess the technical feasibility of repairing the ET TPS, the reasonableness
of conducting those repairs with the vehicle in a vertical, integrated configuration at the Kennedy
Space Center (KSC) Vehicle Assemble Building (VAB), and to address attendant human factors
considerations including worker fatigue and the potential for error. As the assessment
progressed, the latter question evolved to a human factors assessment of the KSC work
environment and adequacy of the process controls applied to PDL-type standard repairs.
ET-124 was subjected to a comprehensive visual inspection and repairs were executed to criteria
documented in the ET Post-Build Acceptance and In-Process Re-Work Requirements Manual,
Offsite, 80901019010 (9010). The 9010 requirements were modified in some instances to
accommodate the high volume of repairs required for ET-124, and NESC reviewed and
concurred with these modifications. The bulk of the damage was assessed and processed in one
of three standard-repair categories: “use-as-is,” (minimal or no rework required), “sand-and-
blend”or“PDL pour.” Hand-packed SLA was used to repair damage to the cable trays. Two
areas of the LO2 tank, one just aft of the composite nose cap and the other in the aft section,
were repaired using a non-standard BX-265 manual spray over the NCFI 24-124. This non-
standard repair technique is similar to that used where the Protuberance Air Load (PAL) ramps
were removed from the intertank and the LO2 and LH2 tanks.
NESC participated in technical discussions surrounding the inspections, repair categorization,
and the repair processes and reviewed supporting planning, testing, and analyses. Key questions
concerning the debris potential posed by undetected crushed foam remaining on ET-124 and
adequacy of the various repair techniques were addressed. Recommendations were forwarded to
the ET Project as the work progressed and all but one of the recommendations was implemented.
NESC concurred with flying ET-124 on the STS-117 mission as-repaired.
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5.0 Assessment Plan
This assessment was conducted to evaluate the STS-117 ET-124 TPS hail damage repair effort.
The task had three primary elements: (1) Evaluate the technical feasibility of repairing the
damaged TPS foam, (2) assess the reasonableness of conducting those repairs with the vehicle in
a vertical, integrated configuration at the KSC VAB, and (3) address attendant human factors
considerations including worker fatigue and the potential for error. As the assessment
progressed, the latter question evolved to a human factors assessment of the KSC work
environment and adequacy of the process controls applied to PDL-type standard repairs.
Team members participated in planning and review meetings and maintained informal
communication with ET Project management. The team participated in several Technical
Interchange Meetings (TIM) and relevant ET Project review boards, most notably the ET Chief
Engineer’s Review Board (CERB). Team members evaluated the effectiveness of verification
testing and analysis performed by the ET Project. A limited amount of independent analysis was
performed by the NESC to confirm flight rationale for non-standard repair processes and to
evaluate flight risk associated with prelaunch icing and thermal conditions during ascent.
NESC Request No.: NESC 07-005-E
Figure 6.1-1. Hail from the February 26,
2007 storm [ref. 26] Figure 6.1-2. Example of Hail Damage to
ET-124 TPS [ref. 27]
^ :^ NASA Engineering and Safety Center Document#: Version:
- ^ ^ Technical Report RP-07-47 1.0
Title: Page #:
STS-117 Hail Damage Repair Assessment 11 of 113
6.0 Description of the Problem and Approach
6.1 Problem Description
Severe thunderstorms with associated hail and high winds struck the STS-117 stack on February
26, 2007 while at Launch Pad 39. Peak winds were recorded at 62 knots with hail size ranging
from 0.3 inch to 0.8 inch in diameter as shown in Figure 6.1-1. The NCFI 24-124 foam on the
LO2 tank ogive acreage and the ET intertank incurred significant damage. NCFI on the ET
intertank and PDL 1034 foam of the LO2 IFRs suffered minor damage, as did the LO2 tank
cable tray SLA. An example of the resulting damage is shown in Figure 6.1-2.
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In the initial damage assessment [ref. 3], the ET Project reported that the nose cone and
machined surface of the LO2 ogive TPS had suffered a significant number of impacts. As Figure
6.1-3 depicts, impact damage to ET-124 was sustained around the entire circumference with the
heaviest concentration on the +Z side with more than 1200 hits. There were numerous areas of
damaged foam in the LO2 tank acreage TPS with the heaviest concentration in the +Z and –Y
quadrants. Minor damage was observed on the inboard side of all LO2 IFRs with crushed foam
observed on the IFRs at stations Xt-634 and Xt-676. Numerous areas of damaged NCFI were
observed in the intertank area with the heaviest sustained in the –Z quadrant. Additional less
severe damage was also observed in the +Z quadrant. Fewer than 12 hits were observed on the
LH2 acreage TPS. Minor damage was observed on the –Y ET / Solid Rocket Booster (SRB)
ramp aft fairing and cable tray and on the forward face of the LH2 IFRs.
Figure 6.1-3. Initial Assessment of Hail Damage to ET-124 [ref. 4]
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6.2 Approach
ET Project performed detailed inspections of the tank and documented the location and extent of
the damage. Inspections addressed all TPS surfaces and exposed composite and metallic
components. Repair plans were developed to return ET-124 to a configuration meeting the
requirements documented in the ET Post-Build Acceptance and In-Process Re-Work
Requirements Manual, Offsite, 80901019010 (referred to herein as “9010”). Some variances
from 9010 requirements were accepted by ET Project Material Review Board (MRB) action to
reduce the number and invasiveness of repairs and minimize removal of undamaged TPS
material. Previously validated standard repair techniques were implemented wherever possible.
6.2.1 Damage Inspection
The ET-124 impact damage inspection involved visual and tactile inspection of the tank surfaces
and defects by experienced KSC United Space Alliance (USA) and Lockheed-Martin Space
Systems Company (LMSSC) personnel [ref. 11]. A detailed TPS inspection grid was developed
and an attributes database establishing to catalog individual impact sites and disposition of
repairs. A summary is presented in Table 6.2-1 [ref. 25].
Exposed polymer matrix composite (PMC) hardware (the nose cap, intertank access door, and
LO2 feedline fairing) were subjected to thermography non-destructive evaluation (NDE) with
the results compared to the baseline inspection data.
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Sand and Blend 888
Use As Repaired 208
ET-124-TS-0015 +Y Aft Fairing Use As Repaired 19
ET-124-TS-0016 -Y Aft Fairing Use As Repaired 6
ET-124-TS-0017 SRB Pal Ramps Use As Repaired 1
ET-124-TS-0018 Ice Frost Ramps C/O Use As Repaired 6
ET-124-TS-0019 Ice Frost Ramps TPS Use As Repaired 4
ET-124-TS-0022 LH2 Tank TPS Nodule Only 2
PDL Repair 19
Use As Repaired 1
ET-124-TS-0023 Intertank TPS PDL Repair 76
ET-124-TS-0024 LO2 Intertank Flange Use As Repaired 105
ET-124-TS-0025 LH2 Tank Flange Use As Repaired 5
ET-124-TS-0026 Vertical Strut Use As Repaired 23
ET-124-TS-0027 Vertical Strut Cable Tray Use As Repaired 23
ET-124-TS-0028 Umbilical Cable Tray Use As Repaired 4
TOTAL 2788
6.2.2 Damage Disposition
The flowchart in Figure 6.2-1 outlines the initial plan for dispositioning TPS damage [ref. 9]. If
the damage was superficial (cosmetic only), no repair was performed. If the damage depth was
less than 0.3 inch, the crushed NCFI was removed and no further repair performed. PDL 1034
repairs were performed on damage greater than 0.3 inch in depth. Surface roughness and
waviness criteria outlined in 9010 were modified to minimize the amount of sanding required. In
two locations where size and density of PDL repairs would have resulted in violation of 9010 or
pertinent Interface Control Document (ICD) requirements, large-area BX-265 spray repairs were
performed. Minor violations of 9010 were accepted by MRB disposition on a case-by-case
basis.
Minimum NCFI thickness criteria were revised downward slightly to minimize the number of
PDL repairs required in the LO2 tank acreage foam. Specifically, the foam thickness criteria for
acreage areas on ET-124 in the No-Ice and Ice Limitation zones were reduced to the minimums
required to maintain an 85 percent launch probability between May and October. The minimum
thickness criterion was reduced to 0.8 inch in the LO2 tank No-Ice zone which included a 0.1
inch thickness buffer to protect against any undetected crushed foam. The minimum thickness
criterion was changed to 0.6 inch in the LO2 Ice-Limitation zone which also includes a 0.1 inch
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buffer. The minimum NCFI thickness of the LH2 tank Ice Limitation zone was changed to 0.88
inch.
Figure 6.2-1. Preliminary Roadmap for ET-124 Repair Evaluation Process [ref. 9]
6.2.3 Repair Execution
6.2.3.1 Sand and Blend
Crushed foam was removed from damage locations less than 0.25 inch in depth and the
remaining NCFI thickness evaluated. Sand and blend repairs were implemented at locations
where the remaining TPS was sufficient to meet the revised minimum foam thickness criteria.
While the 9010 document specifies a 16:1 diameter-to-depth ratio corresponding to a wall angle
of approximately 7.5 degrees for repairs of this type, the criteria was modified for ET-124 to
minimize removal of adjacent NCFI. The edges of defects up to 0.1 inch deep were slightly
rounded. Defects greater than 0.1 inch deep were blended by sanding foam from an area
extending no more than about 0.5 inch from the edge of the damage site. Steeper-than-normal
wall angles were created in both instances. In another variation from the 9010 requirements, red
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dye was not applied to defects before the crushed NCFI was removed. If the final defect depth
did not exceed 0.3 inch and no crack-like indications were evident, red dye was not applied after
the sand-and-blend repair was completed. The result of these variations is an increase in the
potential for day-of-launch ice formation at sand and blend repair locations, and an increased risk
for undetected crushed foam at some locations.
Figure 6.2-2. Sand and Blend Wall Angles for Defects > 0.1” Deep [ref. 24]
6.2.3.2 PDL Repairs
A PDL repair was performed if the acreage TPS thickness remaining under the defect was less
than the required TPS minimum. If damage was visible, the degraded NCFI was removed with a
grinder and the surface was sanded and cleaned. Red dye was then applied to the defect to
highlight any remaining damage. The process was repeated until all crushed foam was removed.
Conathane® 1
 adhesive and PDL-1034 were applied to the repair area per standard processes,
with the exception that up to three small co-located repairs were filled using PDL injected from a
single syringe. Mold removal resulted in minor collateral damage at some locations which was
removed by sanding the surrounding NCFI. PDL repairs were performed to 9010 requirements
with the exception of an initial red dye application, which was not done prior to initial damage
removal and defect depth evaluation. While PDL repair size (diameter, depth, and area)
requirements were met, minor violations to 9010 repair spacing criteria were accepted by ET
Project MRB action at 148 locations, LM IRT action response IRT-25.
6.2.3.3 BX-265 Spray Repairs
Non-standard BX-265 sprays were required in two areas of the LO2 tank where a high
concentration of impact damage precluded PDL repair due to repair spacing and ICD
considerations. One of these locations was adjacent to the ET nose cone and the other in the aft
1 Is a registered trademark of Conap, Inc. Corporation, New York
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ogive region. The forward ogive region adjacent to the nose cone was approximately 20 inches
in length and extended 300 degrees around the tank circumference. The second, in the aft ogive
region, was approximately 20 inches wide by 225 inches long. In both locations, approximately
0.5 inch of NCFI was removed from the LO2 tank acreage to create a foundation for manually-
sprayed BX-265. No evidence of residual damage was detected in either location after the NCFI
was removed and red dye applied [ref. 23].
6.2.3.4 Additional Repairs
Minor repairs to the LO2 tank cable tray (SLA) were performed to 9010 requirements using
standard repair processes.
6.2.4 Flight Rationale
ET Project flight rationale for ET-124 is based on verification by inspection, test, analysis, or
similarity that repairs meet the derived requirements established in the 9010 specification. Flight
performance of repairs conducted using equivalent processes and under similar circumstances
offers additional confidence, especially those done to repair hail damage sustained during the
STS-96 processing flow and woodpecker damage during STS-70. Performance of a stress relief
groove cut in the LO2 tank acreage foam and flown on STS-91 offered some visibility into the
ascent performance of NCFI with significant waviness. The debris risk change posed by the
sheer volume of repairs was assessed by the SSP Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I)
organization using the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) process established after STS-107.
6.2.4.1 Test and Analysis
A number of tests and process demonstrations were conducted by the ET Project to substantiate
flight rationale for ET-124 repair procedures. The key testing focused on crushed NCFI, PDL
repairs, and the BX-265. Process demonstrations were required to validate the BX-265 sprays
and the one-syringe / three-pour process used for the PDL repairs.
6.2.4.1.1 Crushed NCFI 24-124 Foam Testing
The objectives of the crushed NCFI 24-124 testing were to demonstrate that performance of the
repaired and un-repaired crushed foam would be acceptable in expected pre-launch and flight
environments. The combined environments, thermal-vacuum, and hot gas tests were meant to
demonstrate that foam insulating properties would be preserved on the pad and during ascent,
and that significant debris liberation would not occur in flight. Testing was conducted under
conditions intended to simulate the heat rates expected in the LOX ogive area on ascent. Icing
tests were intended to demonstrate that no unacceptable ice/frost buildup will occur even in foam
that is crushed to the detectability limit (i.e., barely visible damage).
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Extensive crushed foam testing was conducted in conjunction with the STS-114 In-Flight
Anomaly (IFA) investigation and much of this data was applicable to ET-124. The results of
tests conducted to support development of STS-96 hail damage flight rationale were also
available and were reviewed. Additional testing of panels with simulated hail damage was
performed at the request of NESC. NCFI 24-124 panels were sprayed to a thickness
representative of the high density impact damage area away from the nose cone BX-265 manual
spray repair. The panels were impacted in such a manner representative of the STS-117 hail
damage. The panels were inspected and repaired using the same techniques, processes and
criteria planned for ET-124. Hot gas testing was then conducted to assess the potential for foam
loss.
6.2.4.1.2 PDL Testing
Hot gas tests were performed for STS-70 on multiple closely-spaced PDL 1034 repairs. For ET-
124, two TPS repair tests were performed to re-qualify PDL 1034 supplied by a new vendor.
These were subjected to thermal vacuum and hot gas conditions.
A process demonstration for multiple PDL 1034 pours from a single syringe load was conducted
at KSC and documented in TPSB SS20-613 and TPSB SS20-614. The revised process was
implemented to increase overall efficiency of the repairs without sacrificing quality. The
efficiency increase was desirable in order to perform repairs in a “production mode” that would
support repair schedule milestones. The demonstration showed that three holes in close
proximity was the limit for a one-syringe application of PDL. No dissection measurements or
photographs were collected during these demonstrations. The process demonstration results are
summarized in Appendix E.
6.2.4.1.3 BX-265 Manual Spray Testing
Key tests run to substantiate the ET-124 BX-265 sprays are outlined at Appendix C. Spray
process demonstrations were conducted to validate the BX-265 repairs. A mockup of the ET
nose cone “pencil sharpener” area was built-up at MAF and sprayed using processes and access
constraints identical to those planned for the flight vehicle. The strength of the sprayed BX-265
was measured using the plug pull technique to validate the application process. Unexpected low
tensile strength measurements in a few plug pulls were attributed to either an off-nominal plug
pull technique or to suspected insecticide contamination. A follow-on flat panel test spray was
conducted and additional tensile strength measurements were taken, tests were conducted to
determine the influence of insecticide contamination.
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6.2.4.2 Flight History
6.2.4.2.1 STS-96 ET-100 Hail Damage: Debris, Ice and TPS Assessment
During on-pad processing for STS-96, ET-100 sustained over 700 instances of impact damage
due to hail. Approximately one-third of those were acceptable “as-is”, one-third were repaired
by blending the damage with adjacent foam, and the remaining one-third were repaired with
PDL fills. All damaged areas in the LO2 tank “no ice zone” were repaired according to certified
design repair criteria.
Flight rationale was presented at the STS-96 / ET-100 Pre-Launch Mission Management Team
(MMT) Review on May 25, 1999 for flying ET-100 as-repaired. The rationale indicated the
blended areas were returned to drawing tolerances. The sand and blended areas met all thickness
and waviness requirements. PDL repairs were certified by a variety of tests and analyses
including wind tunnel testing, radiant ablation tests, combined environments tests, coupon tests,
and manufacturing validations. Tests of simulated hail damage were also conducted as reported
in the test report ETTP-621, Hail Damage Simulation on NCFI 24-124. Stress analysis showed
that the repaired NCFI 24-124 satisfied the 1.10 factor-of-safety requirement.
Figure 6.2-3. STS-96 ET-100 Typical Hail Damage
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Pre-Launch Inspection
Prior to launch of STS-96, a final pre-launch inspection was conducted. There was no Launch
Commit Criteria (LCC), Operation and Maintenance Requirements (OMRS), or National Space
Transportation System (NSTS)-08303 criteria violations. No ice, debris, or TPS problem reports
were identified.
The STS-96 Ice Inspection Team report indicated that the ET in general had no NCFI acreage
icing concerns and no protuberance (i.e. IFR, PAL ramp, bi-pod strut) icing conditions outside of
the established database. The TPS performed nominally during cryogenic propellant loading.
The LO2 tank acreage had visible condensate but no ice or frost formations. All hail repairs
were intact and exhibited no thermal shorts. No anomalies were detected on the inter-tank. The
LH2 tank acreage had condensate but no ice or frost formations. After the pad was cleared for
launch, the Ice Inspection Team continued to monitor the vehicle with remote cameras and infra-
red radiometers. There was no ET acreage ice observed and no noticeable increase in
protuberance icing was detected. The report did indicate that there was extensive surveillance of
the hail damage to verify repair integrity and the absence of ice formation.
Figure 6.2-4. STS-96/ ET-100 Pre- and Post- Launch Comparison
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In-Flight Assessment
A re-configured ET intertank flown on STS-96 incorporated thousands of pin-size vent holes
with 0.3 inch spacing on the ET –Y and +Y thrust panels. Significantly more debris was
observed in the ET separation photography coming from the non-vented areas of the intertank
than from the vented areas. The divots in both areas appeared to be shallow with no primed
substrate visible. There were over 500 divots observed.
ET/Orbiter umbilical separation films were used to observe the hail damage repairs. The repair
areas visible in the sunlit section appeared to be intact and in good condition per the KSC report.
At the Debris Integration Group meeting on March 28, a report from the JSC SE&I Imagery
Integration presented results of a study of the STS-96 (ET-100) LO2 tank repair performance
after hail damage, Shuttle ascent, and ET separation [ref. 17]. The report concerned use of stereo
image analysis to compare the pre-launch tank repairs with a post-separation photo of about the
same region of the tank. This report observed that, post-separation, the repair areas appeared to
have surfaces that were even with or slightly depressed compared to the surrounding foam
surface. None of the possible depressions has measurable depth using their stereo analysis
techniques (it was reported that depressions would have needed to be greater than about 1/2 inch
deep to be measurable). The Imagery Integration team concluded that it is possible that one of
the apparently depressed regions might be associated with a foam loss, but that there was no
quantitative evidence to support the conclusion. The group reported that no other repairs
appeared to have additional foam loss.
A report from the Image Science and Analysis Group at JSC at the same meeting also compared
pre-launch imagery to on-orbit umbilical camera imagery to determine whether hail damage
repairs were observed to be lost during ascent [ref. 2]. Sizes and gray-scale (brightness)
comparisons were made between the pre-launch and on-orbit imagery. The report indicated no
indications of change in the repair footprints, and the color of the repair areas in the on-orbit
photos is reported to be significantly darker than newly exposed foam. The report concluded that
there were no “significant losses” of foam repairs in the observed region of the tank.”
An additional photographic analysis was done by Dr. William Kaukler of the University of
Alabama in Huntsville; performed stereographic analysis of pre-launch and on-orbit photographs
(Figure 6.2-3). Dr. Kaukler investigated 17 regions that he believed to show some indication of
foam recession after ascent. Only one of these regions correlated with a PDL repair (the others
presumably having been sanded regions). Dr. Kaukler reported a “negative correlation” between
the PDL repairs and his observation of foam recession” [ref. 12].
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Post Landing Debris Assessment
Post-landing debris impact assessment of the Orbiter indicated 160 lower surface hits of which
66 were greater than 1 inch. Boeing’s post-landing report for STS-96 [ref. 16], noted that most
of the damage was concentrated from the nose gear to the main landing gear wheel wells on both
left and right chines as shown in Figure 6.2-5.
Figure 6.2-5. Lower Surface Orbiter Damage
The Boeing report also noted the outboard damage sites on the chine areas followed a similar
pattern documented on other missions [ref. 16], as shown in Table 6.2-2. A higher than average
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number of debris impacts along the chine areas was observed for STS-96. The number of impact
damage sites greater than 1 inch was also higher than average, however, the depth of the damage
was relatively shallow.









STS-86 100 27 7 0.4
STS-87 244 109 15 1.5
STS-89 95 38 2.8 0.2
STS-90 76 11 3 0.25
STS-91 145 45 3 0.5
STS-95 139 42 4 0.4
STS-88 80 21 4.5 0.5
STS-96 160 66 4 0.5
This period in the SSP included significant changes in the ET. The Super Lightweight Tank
(SLWT) was introduced with ET-96 concurrent with an increase in “popcorning” foam losses
from NCFI on the intertank. An effort was made to control this through modifications to the
surface of the NCFI foam which ultimately led to the vented configuration adopted for STS-101
(ET-102). ET-100 was one of the tanks in a transitional series which incorporated design
modifications to reduce these intertank foam losses and had modified venting applied to a limited
area as a flight test of this technique. The number of larger than one inch diameter damage sites
on the Orbiter was higher for STS-96 than for other missions with a similar intertank foam
configuration; however, higher-than-normal “popcorning” foam losses were observed for ET-
100. Data in Figures 6.2-5 and 6.2-6 are from [ref. 28]. This data shows “popcorn” foam loss
counts from flight image analysis for ET thrust panels for STS-93, 96, 103, and 101. Higher
foam loss counts are seen for ET-100.
While not conclusive, flight data analysis suggests the damage to the orbiter seen on STS-100
was caused by popcorn foam from the ET intertank and not loss of hail damage repairs.
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Figure 6.2-6. Foam Loss Comparisons for +Y Intertank Thrust Panels
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Figure 6.2-7. Foam Loss Comparisons for +Y Intertank Thrust Panels
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6.2.4.2.2 STS-70 ET-71 Woodpecker Damage: Debris, Ice and TPS Assessment
STS-70 (ET-71) was being prepared for launch in June 1995 when woodpecker damage to the
ET occurred. This tank did not have the NCFI 24-124 intertank foam. The repair process on
damaged areas included trim out and PDL repairs. More than 190 damage sites were reported
and 167 were repaired with PDL. The remaining damage was “used as is” or sanded and
blended [ref. 3]. Repairs began on June 8 and were completed by June 14, 1995.
Pre-Launch Inspection
During the pre-flight final inspection there were no LCC, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria
violations. There were no interim problem reports generated. The inspection team specifically
checked the woodpecker damage repairs. No ice or frost formations, debonds, or material
protrusions were observed.
The ET in general had no acreage or protuberance (i.e. Ice/Frost Ramp (IFR), PAL ramp, bipod
strut) icing conditions outside of the established database. The LO2 tank acreage had
condensate, but no ice or frost formations. The woodpecker damage repairs were intact and
exhibited no thermal shorts. No acreage anomalies were detected in the intertank. There were
typical ice and frost accumulations on the intertank Ground Umbilical Carrier Plate (GUCP).
The LH2 tank acreage had condensate, but no ice or frost formations.
There was no further mention in the report of the time span from the final inspection through
launch. It is assumed there was no additional icing observed from the remote cameras, since the
inspection team summary indicated no interim problem reports were generated
In-Flight Assessment
On-orbit film and video review by KSC indicated the LH2 and LO2 tank acreage was in good
condition with no visible divots or abnormal regression. No divots or TPS anomalies were
observed at the woodpecker damage repair locations. The report also stated there was no
indication of intertank acreage divots. The JSC Photographic Analysis Summary concurred the
woodpecker repairs appeared to be intact.
Post Landing Debris Assessment
Boeing’s post-landing debris assessment indicated lower than average tile damage. There were
81 total lower surface hits with only 5 were greater than 1 inch. The damage sites appeared to be
randomly distributed on the aft half of the Orbiter lower surface. There was some concentration
around the LH2 ET umbilical door. However, the uniform distribution of damage sites in the
chine areas, seen on STS-96, was not present on STS-70
6.2.4.2.3 STS-91 ET-96 Stress Relief Grove
The ET flown on STS-91 was the first of three tanks flown with a stress relief groove cut in the
LO2 ogive acreage foam as shown in Figure 6.2-7. The stress relief groove was required to
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relieve NCFI foam induced compression loading on a LO2 ogive weld joint. The groove was
approximately 14 inches wide, by 6 feet length, 1 inch deep; it was created by sanding and
blending the NCFI. While the modification created significant surface waviness, flight photos
showed no evidence of abnormal erosion or significant foam loss from the LO2 tank (Figure 6.2-
8).
Figure 6.2-8. STS-91 LO2 Tank Stress Relief Groove
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Figure 6.2-9. STS-91 Post-Separation Photo
6.2.4.2.4 Performance History of PDL-1034 Repairs
Standard PDL-1034 repairs are test-demonstrated and have been used extensively over the life of
the Program with outstanding performance [ref. 24]. As discussed in the flight histories of STS-
96 and STS-70, no performance issues were observed with PDL repairs used for previous hail-
and woodpecker-damaged LO2 tanks. There have been no conclusive observations of PDL
repair losses from any LO2 tank, although PDL repair losses from the LH2 tank and intertank
have been observed and were one subject of the STS-114 ET IFA investigation [ref. 15].
A number of documents were reviewed by NESC relevant to the historical performance of PDL
repairs and are summarized in Table B-1 of Appendix B. The PDL Verification and Validation
(V&V) data presented in these reports is limited to four sets of data gathered using similar, but
non-identical, processes. Pre-STS-107 V&V data did not record voids less than 0.5 inch
(reporting size limit). The post-STS-107 longeron repair data set consisted of five samples, three
of which had slot defects up to 0.4 inches in diameter. The last two data sets were taken from
on-tank TPS dissections and recorded cylinder defects from 0.7 inch to 0.98 inch in length and
slot defects up to 0.58 inch in diameter.
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6.2.4.3 Probabilistic Risk Assessment
The large number of repairs on ET-124 represents an unquantified increase in flight risk. In an
effort to estimate the risk incurred by the repairs, the Shuttle Program Systems Engineering and
Integration Office (SE&I) is performing a probabilistic risk assessment for the PDL repairs on
ET-124 [refs. 20, 21]. This analysis assumes that the mass of a liberated repair would be equal
to the mass of PDL represented by the repair volume. Repairs greater than the deterministic
limit of 0.004 lbm are considered for further analysis if they were within the cp = ±110 degree +Z
region of the tank. The conditional per-release hazard for single debris liberation is then
calculated using three assumed timing distributions (uniform 35-135 seconds, following the
heating rate, following the dynamic pressure) and the same debris transport model employed for
previous flights. A release rate of 1/500 is assumed to arrive at a mission risk. This rate is based
on the STS-121 (ET-119) flight during which one PDL repair loss was observed out of about 500
repairs on the tank and assumed typical of most missions. There is uncertainty in this estimate:
ET separation imagery is not captured on all flights, and not all repairs are visible in the images
that do exist. The overall flight risk from PDL repairs is sensitive to the choice of release rate;
for example, if the release rate is halved the risk doubles. Initial SE&I analysis using the 1/500
rate produced an estimated maximum 1:4000 risk for repair loss from the LO2 ogive [ref. 21].
Analysis performed using a 1/100 rate produced an estimated maximum 1:800 risk.
6.2.5 NESC Participation in ET Project Assessment and Planning Meetings
The NESC Team actively participated in the ET-124 hail damage repair effort from early
evaluation of the impact to completion of the repairs. Team members participated in project
planning and review meetings and maintained informal communication with ET Project
management and KSC, MSFC, JSC, and LMSSC personnel.
The hail damage daily engineering assessments were critical planning and reporting meetings
held early in the process of recovery from the hail event. Members of the NESC Assessment
Team participated in these daily teleconferences. The ET Chief Engineer Review Board (CERB)
meetings were held frequently and were the forum for technical discussions of the damage
assessment and repair planning. Those teleconferences were used to discuss repair approaches
and their validation. NESC team members participated in these meetings, especially when key
decision points were being proposed. The NESC team was represented in numerous Technical
Interchange Meetings (TIMs) scheduled when a significant milestone or decision point was
being approached and a significant amount of data was available for review. NESC Assessment
Team members participated in the weekly Shuttle Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB)
meetings during which the ET project routinely discussed status and progress in the ET-124
recovery effort. Additionally, the NESC Assessment Team members engaged in numerous
informal meetings with ET project representatives and with ET and Shuttle Propulsion Chief and
Deputy Chief Engineers. The NESC Assessment Team Lead also participated as a member of an
Independent Review Team (IRT) chartered by the ET Project to review and comment on damage
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repair efforts prior to rollout from the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB). Lockheed-Martin
(LM) responses to actions levied by the IRT.
7.0 Data Analysis
Appendix C contains a list of tests, analyses and miscellaneous documents relevant to the ET-
124 repair that were reviewed by NESC.
7.1 Inspection and Disposition of Damage
Damage inspections were performed by teams of experienced inspectors from engineering and
S&MA and included both MAF and KSC personnel. Despite the extent and thoroughness of
those inspections, the potential remains that some crushed foam may have escaped detection.
Data collected during the STS-114 IFA investigation indicated that crushing up to 15 percent of
thickness cannot be reliably detected by visual inspection. Since red dye was not applied to all
defects as a visual indicator, especially foam in areas where damage was superficial and defects
were dispositioned for use as-is or where sand-and-blend repairs were performed (see section
6.2.3.1), the possibility that some crushed foam remains is increased.
The potential for undetected damage to the tank shell is minimal. Any hail impact sufficient to
cause structural damage to the tank would have left visible damage on foam as well. No pressure
vessel substrate was exposed by any of the impacts.
Inspection of composite components (nose cone, gaseous hydrogen (GH2) pressurization line
fairing, and intertank access door) revealed no anomalies. NESC reviewed and concurs with the
inspection assessment (Appendix J).
7.2 Crushed Foam
The body of crushed foam test data produced in support of the STS-114 IFA is extensive, and is
supplemented by hail damage simulation test data gathered during STS-96. Panels with foam
crushed at various levels were subjected to thermal-vacuum and hot gas testing during the IFA
work and liberation of debris with a mass in excess of the deterministic limit (0.004 lbm)
observed only when large-diameter (3-4 inches) indenters were used to crush the foam to
approximately 20 percent. Crushed foam debris liberated during hot gas testing was observed to
fragment into small pieces immediately on release [refs. 13, 19]. Foam at 51 damage sites on
ET-124 was treated with red dye and removed incrementally to assess damage depth. LO2 NCFI
crushing did not extend beyond about 0.2 inch of the defect bottom, and ET intertank crushing
was limited to a depth of about 0.1inch of the defect [ref. 1]. Data from dissection of STS-96 test
panels is consistent with these observations; however, since the STS-96 simulations do not
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envelope the STS-117 hail event due to significant differences in magnitude, rate, and cross-
sectional area over which energy was dispersed in those test articles, NESC recommended
additional tests be conducted on panels designed to simulate the STS-117 damage. These tests
showed a linear relationship between energy of impact and depth of TPS damage consistent with
the STS-96 results, with the bulk of the crushed foam found within about 0.2 inch of the defect
bottom [refs. 5, 24]. Hot gas tests were conducted on un-repaired NCFI panels subjected to STS-
117 simulated damage (both static and dynamic) and no significant debris release was observed
[ref. 8]. Recession rates for these panels were in-family.
Figure 7.2-1. Hot Gas Test of NCFI Panel Subjected to Static Loads Simulating STS-117
[ref. 8]
On the basis of these tests, NESC concurs that significant debris release or accelerated TPS
recession due to residual crushed foam is unlikely.
Surface and Interstitial Ice
The potential for ice to form on or in areas of residual crushed foam was assessed. Results of
multiple cyrogenic cycle and thermal vacuum tests performed on an NCFI panel with “barely
detectible” crushed foam (crush level of approximately 15 percent) were reviewed. No ice
formed during any of the 9-hour cryogenic cycles at average ambient temperatures of 62 deg F
and 93 percent relative humidity. No debris in excess of the deterministic level was liberated in
the subsequent thermal-vacuum test [ref. 6]. The test setup and conditions were conservative and
bracket conditions expected at KSC for a June or July launch.
If the outer surface of the NCFI is at 90 deg F and the inner surface is at -297 deg F (LO2
cryogenic temperature), the temperature will be 32 deg F, 20 percent of the way into the foam
thickness. That is, for 1 inch of foam, the 32 deg F isotherm will be 0.20 inch below the surface.
The minimum thickness of foam remaining in the sand and blend repairs is 0.65 inch, so freezing
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temperatures at those locations can occur 0.13 inch below the surface. If ambient temperatures
are lower, sub-freezing temperatures can be expected even closer to (or the same as) the NCFI
surface temperature. In the test series referenced earlier, temperatures as low as 30 deg F were
detected at the surface 6 hours into cryogenic chilldown. The implication is that sub-freezing
temperatures can be expected within a region of undetected crushed foam regardless of ambient
temperature, so the possibility that ice may form in a void created by damaged cell walls internal
to a region of crushed foam (interstitial ice) cannot be dismissed on the basis of temperature
alone.
Data collected during development of NESC hydrophobic coatings offers some insight into the
mass of water that can be expected to accumulate in undamaged NCFI (Appendix H). Absent a
communication path from the foam interior to the surface, crushed NCFI can be expected to
contain a similar amount of liquid water. One inch core samples taken from freshly sprayed and
15-month weathered NCFI panels contained a maximum of 0.48 to 1.48 grams of water,
respectively, within 0.25 inch of the NCFI surface (Appendix H, pg 8-9). Hail-damaged crush
sites seen on ET-124 were on the order of an inch in diameter and, as noted previously, had
damage typically extending no more than 0.2 inch beneath the surface. The amount of water
contained in the 1 inch x 0.25 inch samples tested thus offers a reasonable estimate of the release
mass that can be expected if all the water in a damage site was frozen and liberated as a single
piece of debris.
Water accumulation significantly greater than the values above is unlikely, even if a
communication path from the surface to the interior of a crushed foam region does exist. Air
trapped in the cavity will prevent entry of liquid water unless a vent path is also present, and
surface tension of the liquid will inhibit flow. If liquid water does find its way into a cavity from
the NCFI surface, the increased thermal conductivity would tend to warm the deeper layers and
reduce the likelihood ice will form. Cavity volume would be limited by the size of the damaged
area. Again, samples collected from ET-124 and in conjunction with STS-96 and STS-117
damage simulations suggest crushed areas on the order of an inch in diameter by no more than
0.25 inch deep are to be expected. The presence of undetected large-scale crushed areas in the
ET-124 tank acreage is unlikely, given the extensive inspections performed after the hail event.
Two mechanisms exist that could precipitate ice debris liberation from a region of crushed foam:
void-delta pressure (V-dP) and aerodynamic heating / erosion. Neither provides a likely
mechanism for liberation of surface or interstitial ice in crushed foam, even if such ice were to
form. The V-dP mechanism would require presence of a void in the acreage foam adjacent to the
ice, formed either during application of machine-sprayed NCFI or as cell walls were collapsed
during crushing of the foam. Machine-sprayed NCFI has a low incidence of void entrapment,
and the probability that multiple, disconnected voids would form in crushed foam oriented in
such a way that one would produce ice while the other did not is remote. Aerodynamic heating /
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erosion would ablate the material from outside in and extensive hot gas testing indicates it does
not typically produce debris in excess of the 0.004 lbm deterministic limit.
At this time, ambient temperature conditions on day of launch are expected to be much higher
than the conditions successfully test demonstrated for known crushed foam conditions. Rain
would increase heat transfer to the foam surface that would decrease the likelihood of icing. In
addition, multiple day of launch inspections using visual, IR and SURFICE techniques
are planned to ensure to acceptable launch conditions.
Given the above rationale, NESC concurs that surface or interstitial ice is unlikely to form in the
vicinity of any residual crushed foam on ET-124 and the debris risk posed by such is remote.
7.3 Repair Processes
Standard repair processes appear adequate with procedures providing sufficient level of detail to
minimize the potential for human errors. All repair processes applied to ET-124 have been
validated by test. Technicians performing repairs were trained and certified to perform the work.
The Kennedy Space Center (KSC) workforce received safety classroom training and on-the -job
task-specific training. ET foam repair certifications (Critical Skill Certification CSR 889, “ET
Foam Application for Repair”) did not include dissection and analysis of PDL sample pours.
Only experienced MAF technicians performed non-standard repairs.
Red dye was used as a damage indicator during inspections and in conjunction with all the repair
procedures employed on the tank. Effectiveness of the dye as an indicator was demonstrated by
test during the STS-114 IFA investigation.
7.3.1 Sand and Blend Repairs
In an attempt to minimize the removal of undamaged NCFI from ET-124 and also limit the
number of PDL repairs required, minimum foam thickness criteria were reassessed and new sand
and blend contours were developed and verified during the hail damage recovery effort. Wall
angles of the blends are steeper than those that would have resulted had the original
aerodynamically-derived blending requirements required by 9010 been applied and many of the
blends are deeper than the drawing-specified minimum foam thickness. NESC reviewed the test
and analysis that provides the rationale for revisions to the drawing requirements and 9010
criteria.
7.3.1.1 NESC Analysis of Waviness Criteria
During the development of the Space Shuttle, an ET outer mold line surface waviness criteria
was defined by the Shuttle thermal community so that the manufacturing team would have a
reasonable guideline as to how smooth the ET foam surface needed to be. The original spray-on-
foam insulation (SOFI) equipment produced a corrugated, spiral pattern that would increase the
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local aerodynamic heating, at the top of the corrugations, relative to an “undisturbed” flat plate
value that was determined from smooth wind tunnel models. The original waviness criterion
was sized so that the local heating, on the LO2 tank ogive, would not exceed 1.3 times the
corresponding smooth surface value. The corresponding “wave” amplitude and length for the
ET ogive and intertank are specified in Martin Marietta Corporation (MMC) drawing
80971118408. The actual dimensions vary with position along the ogive, with the smallest
wavelength and amplitude at Xt=371 being 3 inches and 0.18 inch, respectively.
Unfortunately, a similar criteria for cavity dimensions has never been incorporated into the ET
drawing system, thus any cavity type feature has historically been treated as if it was a surface
wave even though the local flow physics of the two features is very different. The diameter of
the cavity, at the SOFI outer surface was being used as the wavelength, and the depth of the
cavity as the wave amplitude. Any cavity that did not meet the aerodynamic waviness criteria
was repaired per the directions in MMC drawing 80901019010, which requires that the surface
“smoothness” meet the aerodynamic waviness criteria.
The large number of hail damage sites, on ET-124, brought this issue to the SSP Thermal Panel
several times during March of 2007. During the discussions, Marshall Space Flight Center
(MSFC) Engineering noted that cavity heating test data had been developed and compared it to
the literature after the STS-96 hail damage event. This work was presented to the SSP Thermal
Panel on March 15, 2007 and a recommendation made that the “aerodynamic waviness” criteria
not be used to size the cavity repairs. Doing so would cause good NCFI foam to be removed
unnecessarily as cavities were enlarged to meet the aerodynamic waviness criteria. It was further
recommended that the cavity walls be sloped to minimize the local heating to the downstream
wall. The SSP Thermal Panel and NESC concurred with these recommendations. MSFC
Engineering and the ET Project developed and implemented a revised cavity repair specification
for the Sand and Blend and Use As Repaired (USR) or Use As Inspected (USI) repairs.
Supporting thermal analyses are documented in two SSP Thermal Panel presentations, one by
Michelle Guillot of Lockheed Martin, and the other by Tibor Lok, a USA consultant and IRT-24
demonstrated that the NCFI bond line temperature was a strong function of the internal LO2
ullage temperature and only a weak function of the external aerodynamic heating. Thus, even
large changes to the external heat transfer rate, such as a factor of two or three, only cause
modest increases to the maximum bond line temperature which occurs just before Space Shuttle
Main Engine (SSME) shut down, well after peak aerodynamic heating. Panels configured with
representative rounded-edge and 0.5 inch sanded-wall-angle sand and blend repairs were
subjected to hot gas testing on April 14, 2007 [ref. 7]. Results demonstrated acceptable recession
rates and no significant debris liberation.
NESC concurs, on the basis of these tests and analyses, that the modified waviness criteria
developed for ET-124 are acceptable for flight and the shape of the sand and blend repairs should
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be optimized to minimize ice formation prior to launch, instead of only minimizing ascent
heating.
Figure 7.3-1. Hot Gas Test of NCFI Panel Containing Multiple Steep-Wall Sand and
Blend Repairs [ref. 7]
7.3.1.2 NESC Modified Sand and Blend Criteria and Minimum Foam Thickness
ET Project developed an option to perform deeper than normal sand and blend (S&B) repairs,
i.e., repairs that would violate the minimum NCFI foam thickness required by the external tank
drawings. The minimum NCFI thickness required to prevent external ice formation on the
oxygen tank while ensuring an 85 percent launch probability between May and October was first
established. The Program’s 30-year KSC weather data base was used as input to an ice
simulation program and the NCFI thicknesses in the no-ice and limited icing zones were adjusted
until the 85 percent criterion was met. This effort resulted in minimum foam thicknesses of
0.8 inch in the no-ice zone and 0.6 inch in the limited ice zone vs. the established drawing
minima of 1.0 inch.
The second step in this effort was to devise a method of sorting the hail damage locations into
S&B and PDL repair. That is, to identify the icing potential of each prospective S&B repair and
to repair with PDL those that might ice. To enable this sorting, ET Project devised an icing test
in a natural convection chamber. A box fan was included in the test to allow for some forced
convection. Liquid nitrogen-backed foamed panels with cavities of different depths and shapes
were tested to identify the icing limits. The results were used to sort the repairs into PDL and
S&B, resulting in 26 suggested PDL repairs and 301 S&B repairs. Three repairs that did not
meet the sort criteria were re-designated as PDL due to concerns about an increased icing risk at
these locations and depths.
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Figure 7.3-2. Sand and Blend Criteria Icing Test [ref.10]
NESC investigation of the historic weather at KSC showed that the 85 percent cutoff coincided
with wind speeds that would cause the heat transfer on the LO2 ogive to be dominated by forced
convection; as a consequence, there was an issue with directly using the results of a natural
convection test with limited forced convection to assess the potential for S&B icing. NESC
performed a physics-based non-dimensionalization of the icing potential to allow a relative
assessment of the S&B icing potential from all the repair sites (Appendix F). The analysis
showed that the three repair sites that had been re-designated for PDL did indeed have icing
potential that exceeded other S&B sites, thus confirming the ET Project selection. The analysis
also identified 11 other repair sites that had been selected for S&B that had icing potential which
exceeded that of sites that had already been designated for PDL repair. NESC recommended
these sites be repaired with PDL, and ET Project accepted the recommendation. Because the
tests performed to establish; the PDL versus S&B repair criteria were not fully representative of
the launch pad heat transfer physics, the possibility remained that launch probability due to icing
could be substantially less than 85 percent. To address this concern, NESC performed a
sensitivity analysis using the 30-year KSC weather set and demonstrated that, even if the physics
used to set the cutoff was off by a factor of two, the probability that day-of-launch icing would
not exceed Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) requirements still exceeded 55 percent. This
assessment is detailed in (Appendix G).
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7.3.2 PDL Repairs
Over 900 PDL repairs were made on the ET LO2 tank, which is approximately an order of
magnitude more than normal. In general, the specified PDL repair density limits (repairs per
square foot and distance between repairs) have been test-validated and demonstrated to have no
effect on NCFI integrity.
Figure 7.3-3. STS-70 Multiple PDL Repair Test Panel [ref. 3]
PDL material used on ET-124 had to be requalified due to a vendor change. Testing done to
support the requalification also demonstrates acceptable performance of multiple PDL and S&B
repairs in an environment similar to that expected on the LO2 tank at ascent [ref. 5].
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Figure 7.3-4. Hot Gas Test of PDL Repair Panel Containing Multiple Repairs [ref. 3]
7.3.2.1 NESC Human Factors Assessment of PDL Application Processes
The NESC Human Factors (HF) team reviewed procedures and working conditions prior to
execution of PDL repairs on ET-124. The team visited the VAB work area, observed a
damaged-foam removal demonstration and a procedure development “table top” review, and
interviewed engineers and technicians involved in the work. The HF team did not make any
direct observations of repairs in-progress on the tank or on high-fidelity mockups.
Procedures incorporated relevant input from all major stakeholders including technicians,
engineering, and Quality Control (QC) representatives from the United Space Alliance (USA),
NASA Engineering from KSC and MSFC, and Lockheed Martin, MAF. Work steps included
appropriate inspection points and were written in accordance with standing procedures,
requirements, and standards. The PDL repair processes varied slightly from those implemented
in the past at MAF and KSC. In order to complete the number of repairs required in a reasonable
amount of time, KSC adopted an “assembly line” process wherein defects were addressed in
parallel instead of individually; i.e., rather than fully repair one defect at a time, technicians
performed surface preparation of all defects, applied Conathane® to all defects, installed molds,
poured PDL and allowed it to cure, then removed all the molds and performed final trimming. In
another change from the normal process, a single charge of uncured PDL was used to fill as
many as three separate defects. These changes allowed for significant gains in processing
efficiency. The three pour procedure was successfully demonstrated prior to implementation.
The NESC did note that while a maximum allowable delay before pouring PDL at a given
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temperature is specified, the procedures did not include verification steps to ensure this pour time
was not exceeded and recommended quality inspector timing of multiple PDL pours from a
single syringe to the procedure development team. The team also recommended that red dye
application procedures be strengthened with specific work steps in lieu of notes. These
recommendations were subsequently implemented.
Figure 7.3-5. ET-124 Access and Lighting in the VAB
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Figure 7.3-6. ET-124 Nose Cone Area Access
Training, work area access, and lighting were reviewed. The PDL repair certification / re-
certification procedures used at KSC and MAF are slightly different. Most notably, the KSC
training procedures do not include steps for dissection and analysis of PDL repairs, and the test
panels used for KSC training are not made with NCFI foam. While access to the work area was
adequate, NESC noted the lighting in the LOX ogive work area was insufficient for some tasks
such as inspection of Conathane® application and identification of damaged foam prior to red
dye application. NESC recommended improvements to lighting in the work areas, and that
recommendation was accepted and implemented.
The Project was diligent in ensuring all known critical parameters were controlled. PDL repairs
were not subjected to detailed evaluation to ascertain what effects minor process variations may
have on internal void size or distribution. The existing body of PDL repair void data is
summarized in Appendix B, Table B-1 and assumed applicable to the repairs done on ET-124,
though no recorded data exists to validate this assumption. While the bulk of the repairs done at
MAF are performed with the tank horizontal, all ET-124 repairs were done with the tank vertical.
As the data in table B-1 indicates, this increases the potential for void formation. Process repair
demonstrations were conducted on BX-265 panels to validate the three pour / one syringe
technique, but the repair samples were not subjected to controlled dissection and no void size or
distribution data was recorded documented in KSC TPSB SS20-613 and TPSB SS20-614,
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(Appendix E). Approximately 32 repairs were removed from the tank to address a concern
relating to the underlying Conathane® application but again, no sub-surface void data was
collected as the repairs were removed. The on-tank dataset is thus limited to verbal “no voids
noted” reports gathered in conjunction with the validation tests and repair removals.
Despite a variety of process controls, the sheer number of repairs increased the probability that
process escapes or creep could occur. Manually sprayed foam applications are normally
validated by lead-in / lead-out tests done on mock-ups, and NESC recommended this process be
extended to the hail damage repairs through routine collection of sample data as those repairs
were performed. Ideally, sample repairs would have been made on NCFI or BX-265 panels off
the tank at the beginning and end of every processing shift and those repairs dissected to monitor
sub-surface void size and distribution. This would have yielded a body of data to validate the
void distributions assumed for the subsequent PRA and would have provided visibility to ensure
no process creep was occurring as the repairs were completed. The Shuttle Program did not
implement this recommendation, and no in-process data was collected. The Program proposed
gathering additional data from PDL test pours after all on-tank PDL repairs were complete. Such
data would not have been sufficient to address the process creep concern, however, and given the
unknown effects minor process variations may have on internal void size and distribution may
have led to erroneous conclusions. Consequently, NESC concurred with not gathering PDL test
pour data after the on-tank PDL repairs were complete.
Figure 7.3-7. Sectioned PDL Repair Following Hot Gas Test [ref. 5]
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Although no on-tank void distribution data was collected, it is reasonable to assume the quality
of the ET-124 repairs does not differ significantly from those applied to other tanks, with most
repairs similar to the one depicted in figure 7.3-7. PDL repair application is a multi-step process,
and as noted earlier the Project was diligent in ensuring that controls were placed on each step in
the process. Previous dissection data indicates that internal voids are expected in PDL
applications (see Section 6.2.4.2.4). The bulk of the repairs are small (approximately 1 inch in
diameter by 0.5 inch deep) and any extremely large voids would likely have breached the repair
surface and failed inspection. NESC concurs with the use of previously-collected MAF data for
the PRA with the recognition that lack of specific knowledge regarding the size and location of
sub-surface voids in ET-124 repairs adds additional uncertainty to the results.
7.3.2.2 PDL Repair Process Control Issues
The current Shuttle PRACA definitions of process escapes and catches are [ref.18]:
• “A process escape is defined as any problem identified after it should have been detected
during normal processing. Process escapes include problems found during surveillance
sampling, inspection (including random), or audit after final closeout, or final flight
configuration verification.”
• “A problem can be defined as a process catch if it is identified during normal processing
(departing from procedure), inspection, or surveillance sampling prior to final closeout or
during testing.”
Several process control issues (catches and escapes) occurred during ET-124 repairs, including a
Conathane® application issue, collateral damage during mold removals, and a PDL maximum
hardness verification issue. These process issues provided an indicator that existing process
controls were not completely effective, and they raised questions about additional process issues
that may have occurred but were not identified as either process catches or escapes.
The PDL repair rework rate resulting from these process control issues exceeded 30 percent (32
re-repairs due to the Conathane® application issue, 88 missed Shore A hardness tests,
approximately 300 sand and blend repairs due to collateral damage incurred during mold
removals, and several post-application repair discrepancies). Rework rates from comparable
industry processes can be expected to be at least an order of magnitude lower than the PDL
repair rework rate. For comparison, six-sigma process performance corresponds to 3.4 defects
per million units, or a defect rate of 0.00034 percent. In statistical process control, the process
boundaries used to support calculations of process capability (C p indices) usually do not include
post-process inspections, so process catches and process escapes do not affect measures of
process capability.
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Conathane® Application Process Issue
KSC OP-300 Step 16 states: “Conathane® is to be applied to a thickness of 0.003 to 0.010
inches, measured with 1 each wet film gage.” However, a note in the procedure also stated:
“Adhesive thickness shall be determined using a wet film gage, when necessary. In the event
that an area is inaccessible to these instruments, a visual verification of thin, uniform coating
shall satisfy the thickness requirement.” The wet film gage is required for all thickness
verifications. The procedural discrepancy with the requirement was identified by USA Quality
Control, and the corrective action was a permanent deviation (redline change) to the operating
procedure that removed the visual verification option. Approximately 32 discrepant repairs were
removed and those ET locations were re-repaired.
Post -Application Discrepancies
Several discrepancies were noted during post-application inspection of repairs, including some
PDL underfills and surface voids. The discrepant repairs were removed from the tank and
replaced.
Collateral Damage During Mold Removal
Minor unexpected damage to surrounding NCFI occurred when PDL pour molds were removed.
The “production line” repair environment left molds installed on the tank for a longer period of
time than is typical when individual repairs are made. As a consequence, the sealant used to
attach the molds lifted some NCFI rind as it was removed. The damage was removed by light
sanding.
PDL Maximum Hardness Verification Process Issues
MAF work instructions contain maximum hardness verification for all PDL repairs per
acceptance criteria. Shore A hardness tests are performed to ensure that the hard surfaces of the
PDL repairs have been sanded/removed. This test was typically not performed on sanded foam
at KSC during OP-300. Lockheed Martin Engineering identified the omission as a process issue
following an in-depth comparison of KSC and MAF procedures, and the paperwork was changed
to have Shore A hardness tests performed on all PDL applications on the LO2 tank. Hardness
tests were also to be performed for accessible PDL repairs on the LH2 tank. A Material Review
(MR) action was initiated for all inaccessible locations on the LH2 tank. During post-test paper
reviews, it was discovered that 88 PDL applications from the initial group of LO2 tank repairs
did not have Shore A hardness tests performed. KSC Engineering wrote an operation to perform
the hardness test on the initial 88 repairs, to date this work has not been completed and the
Project is working towards acceptance of a "use as is" MR.
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7.3.2.3 PDL Process Improvements
ET-124 repairs benefited from lessons learned during the STS-114 IFA investigation. Multiple
red dye applications were made to ensure all crushed foam was removed from PDL repair
locations, thus minimizing the potential for entrapment of a void in crushed foam beneath a
repair. ET-124 repairs were of a relatively simple geometry, with NCFI excavated from the tank
using Dotco®2 cutters similar to those pictured in Figure 7.3-8. These cutters excavate a circular
hole with a square-edged bottom identical to the cutter profile. The NESC Human Factors team
noted that application of a radius to the bottom shoulder of the cutting blades would produce a
bathtub shaped hole less likely to trap voids during PDL backfill. A Dotco® tool guide
developed by technicians for use as a shop aid in excavating NCFI foam illustrates a creative
process improvement to increase repair reliability. Unfortunately, the Dotco® tool guide was not
fielded in time to support the ET-124 repairs. Other such improvements could be implemented
to minimize the size and number of voids produced by the repair process.
7.3.2.4 PDL Repair Summary
PDL repairs have been routinely implemented throughout the life of the Shuttle Program and are
supported by test and analysis. Flight history, though necessarily limited due to tank visibility
and photographic resolution issues, has shown few repair losses over the course of the Program;
indeed, no losses from the LOX tank have been positively identified. PDL application
2 Is a registered trademark of Dotco, Inc. Corporation Ohio Hicksville Ohio
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procedures developed at KSC appeared adequate and all steps in the repair process were
protected by process controls. Although the void distribution of on-tank repairs is assumed
identical to that observed in repairs done at MAF, no data exists to substantiate this assumption
and no in-process data was collected as a control against process creep. Such data would
strengthen flight rationale, but NESC concurs with flight on the strength of the process controls
known to be in place when the repairs were implemented.
7.3.3 BX-265 Repair Sprays
Figure 7.3-9. Partial View of ET-124 Pencil Sharpener BX-265
Spray Repair Area [ref. 24]
The BX-265 spray process was validated with a demonstration spray performed on an ET nose
cone mockup [ref. 11]. Post-test dissections revealed no voids. NESC reviewed the plug-pull
data collected in conjunction with the test and with a subsequent flat-panel spray and concurs
with ET Project that the low values observed in the demonstration samples likely occurred due to
contamination of the test article surface. Data collected from lead-in / lead-out sprays performed
when the BX-265 repair was made to the flight article were well within spec and adequate to
demonstrate acceptable material properties. The sprays were applied to the LO2 tank by
experienced MAF technicians using identical techniques and equipment. Adhesion of the BX-
265 material to the Conathane® layer has been demonstrated in previous tests conducted to
validate the PAL ramp repair process and confirmed through hot gas tests performed for ET-124
[ref. 11]. These tests demonstrated BX-265-over-NCFI performance in environments similar to
those expected in the ET-124 LO2 ogive area on ascent. No foam liberation in excess of the
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0.004 lbm deterministic limit was noted, and no significant erosion occurred. This testing
envelopes conditions expected in the aft portion of the LO2 tank. NESC reviewed the thermal
analysis performed by ET Project to demonstrate no significant increase in bondline temperature
would occur at the BX-265 to NCFI interface and concurs with the assertion that the 300 degrees
F temperature limit will not be violated [ref. 24].
BX265 and NCFI Coefficient of Thermal Expansion (CTE) Mismatch
At -320 deg F (LO2 substrate temperatures), aluminum has a CTE of -0.0031, NCFI 24-124 a
CTE of -0.0166, and BX-265 a CTE of -0.01812 [ref. 14]. The difference of about 10 percent
between BX-265 and NCFI is not sufficient to impart stress in the TPS beyond the limits of
material capability and does not pose a concern for in-flight debris liberation. The 0.5 inch layer
of BX-265 will not insulate the NCFI sufficiently to impart significant internal stress in the
material, and thermal cracking of the kind seen in the PAL and ice / frost ramp area is
improbable. The underlying structure in the ogive areas of interest is stable and will not impart
undue loads in the TPS.
On the basis of these tests and analyses, NESC concurs that the debris release above
deterministic limits or accelerated TPS recession in the areas of the BX-265 spray repairs is
unlikely.
7.4 Flight Risk Assessment
The Program’s PRA approach is identical to that of previous missions and suffers from the same
limitations, primarily the uncertainties inherent in estimates of debris mass, debris release timing,
transport, and orbiter impact damage. As noted in previous NESC assessments, the PRA should
not be used as a discrete estimate of flight risk but is suitable only for assessing the relative risk
posed by various debris sources.
Two key variables affect the ET-124 PRA, the PDL repair release rate and release mass
estimates. SE&I approached the release rate estimate by assuming 1 repair out of 500 would be
lost, given the performance history of similar repairs on previous missions [ref. 21]. The history
of PDL repair losses from the LO2 ogive (the area of primary interest and that which poses the
highest flight risk due to the potential for debris transport to critical locations on the orbiter) has
been difficult to ascertain due to limitations inherent in flight imagery. Clearly, no wholesale
loss of PDL repairs has been observed but estimates of actual repair losses over the history of the
Shuttle Program are not definitive with verbal estimates ranging from none to two. SE&I
assessed the sensitivity of the 1/500 estimate by doing a comparative analysis using a 1/100
release rate. Resultant failure probabilities ranged from 1:4000 for the lower rate to 1:800 for the
higher [ref. 21]. NESC concurs with the approach, given the absence of anything more
substantive on which to base the analysis; however, the resultant uncertainty is high and cannot
be taken as a discrete estimate of flight risk.
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SE&I approached the release mass estimate by assuming complete repairs would be lost from the
tank and that the total mass of any given repair would thus provide a conservative estimate of the
debris mass. Only those repairs with a mass greater than the 0.004 lbm deterministic limit and
located in the critical debris zone (cp = ±_110 degree +Z region of the tank) were used for initial
analyses. While this approach simplifies the analysis, it does not address the physics underlying
V-dP foam losses and may not be conservative. A divot would originate at a void in the PDL
repair. As it is released it typically tears away overlying material, resulting in a cone-shaped
chunk. A divot shaped like the frustum of a cone would be expected to have a cone half angle of
60 degrees, with the smaller end having the surface area of the original defect. The resultant
mass of PDL and the NCFI in the divot can easily exceed that of the repair. When the mass of
the PDL repair itself is used as the mass loss, there are only 86 repairs with masses >0.004 lbm.
When the adjacent NCFI torn out in the divot is included, there are more than 700 possible losses
with masses above 0.004 lbm. Adding the adjacent NCFI volume significantly increases the
number of repairs which must be assessed but provides a more realistic estimate of the risk.
NESC recommended the PRA be conducted using divot masses so-calculated rather than
performing the initial sorting by the total repair mass initially planned. The NESC analysis
methodology and results are at Appendix I. The Program concurred with this recommendation.
7.5 Summary
Tests and analyses performed to substantiate the repairs planned for ET-124 were well-
formulated and provide an adequate foundation for flight rationale. The biggest weakness in
flight rationale is the assumption that the sub-surface void distribution for on-tank PDL repairs is
in family to that observed in repairs done at MAF. Although no direct evidence exists to
substantiate this assumption, the NESC concurs with flight on the strength of the process
controls known to be in place when the PDL repairs were implemented.
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8.0 Findings, Observations, and Recommendations
8.1 Findings
F-1. Inspections and engineering assessment conducted by ET Project were rigorous and well-
implemented; however the potential that some residual crushed foam remains on ET-124
cannot be eliminated.
F-2. Review of test databases indicates crushed foam tests do not fully envelope ET-124 due
to differences in magnitude, rate, and cross-sectional area over which test samples were
crushed.
F-3. Debris release in excess of deterministic limits due to residual crushed foam on ET-124 is
unlikely as is the potential for accelerated erosion.
F-4. The additional component of risk offered by multiple repairs is difficult to quantify, but
this risk is mitigated by established process controls.
F-5. Modified sand and blend surface waviness and wall angle criteria are test-substantiated
and adequate to address flight safety risks.
F-6. Eleven sites selected for S&B repair should be resdesignated for PDL on the basis of
icing potential as demonstrated by the NESC non-dimensionalized analysis.
F-7. Specified repair density limits (repairs per square foot and distance between repairs) are
test-validated with no adverse effect on NCFI integrity.
F-8. Additional controls on PDL repairs are necessary to ensure pour time and red dye
application requirements are not violated.
F-9. KSC training procedures do not include steps for dissection and analysis of PDL repairs,
and the test panels used for KSC training are not made with NCFI foam.
F-10. Lighting in the LOX ogive work area was insufficient for some tasks.
F-11. The existing body of PDL repair void data is summarized in Appendix B, Table B-1 and
assumed applicable to the repairs done on ET-124, but no recorded data exists to validate
this assumption.
F-12. PDL repair processes do not provide for collection of in-process data.
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F-13. Controls applied to the PDL repair process are adequate, but some process catches and
escapes have been noted. The large number of repairs applied to the tank increases the
possibility that undetected process escapes may have occurred.
•	 Conathane® application issue drove removal of 32 repairs
•	 Collateral damage occurred during mold removal
•	 Some under-fills and surface voids were noted which required re-repair
•	 Omission of post-repair Shore-A hardness testing for 88 repairs
F-14. PDL repair processes could be improved through a detailed P-FMEA and process
sensitivity study.
F-15. Debris release above deterministic limits or accelerated TPS recession in the areas of the
BX-265 spray repairs is unlikely.
F-16. Total repair mass does not provide a conservative estimate of potential debris mass loss.
Debris mass may exceed total repair mass when cone-shaped divot models are employed
for mass calculations.
8.2 Observations
O-1. Review of repair processes and flight history highlight no areas of concern not already
addressed.
O-2. Primary issue facing ET-124 is the cumulative risk posed by repeated performance of
process-sensitive repair tasks.
O-3. Sand-and-Blend, PDL and BX-265 repairs are process-sensitive tasks and developmental
testing and process controls are the primary debris risk mitigators.
O-4. The PDL repair process is known to generate non-detectable sub-surface voids which can
liberate debris in flight.
O-5. STS-96 flight history (ET-100 hail damage), and STS-70 flight history (woodpecker
damage) show minimal foam loss. Orbiter damage seen on the STS-96 mission coincides
with changes made to ET intertank TPS and was probably caused by loss of “popcorn”
form from that area of the tank.
O-6. Few repair losses have been noted from other flight tanks, especially from the LO2 tank
region, despite the large number of repairs performed; however, flight experience is
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based on limited field-of-view, post-sep imagery and is subject to some limitations.
O-7. Previous repairs have been done using processes that are similar, but not identical, to
those employed for ET-124. Chief differences include the vertical attitude of the tank
and modifications implemented to facility “mass production” of ET-124 repairs.
O-8. PRA is useful only as a tool for comparing relative risks from debris sources and should
not be taken as a measure of the absolute risk.
O-9. Increment of risk assumed in multiple PDL repairs is difficult to quantify.
O-10. Repair release rates drive the risk assessment results but those rates used in the STS-117
PRA are estimates and subject to uncertainties inherent in limited data.
8.3 Recommendations
R-1. Proceed with flight of ET-124 as-repaired [F.1 – F.15].
R-2. Perform additional crushed foam testing on panels with simulated hail damage
(implemented) [F.2].
R-3. Perform PDL repairs instead of sand-and-blends at 11 locations identified as high-risk for
icing (implemented) [F.6].
R-4. Collect in-process data during performance of in-place PDL repairs (not implemented)
[F.11, F.12].
R-5. Implement specific improvements to address concerns noted during human factors team
review of the KSC PDL repair process (implemented) [F.8, F.10]
• Time PDL pours
• Document red dye application processes in specific work steps vs. procedural notes
• Improve workplace lighting before application of PDL repairs
R-6. Update the KSC PDL repair certification/recertification procedures to include steps for
dissection of the PDL pours made on foam test panels. After dissection, require
technicians to identify and measure any subsurface voids that are present [F.9].
R-7. Perform formal Process Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (P-FMEAs) on ET repair
processes in order to identify and mitigate potential process escapes and process catches
[F.13, F.14].
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R-8. Mass estimates based on V-dP physics (cone-shaped divot with 60-degree wall angles)
should be used for PRA mass loss estimates.
9.0 Lessons Learned
L-1. Performing trend analyses on process catches and process escapes will provide a more
proactive and robust approach for identifying and fixing process control issues. The
Space Shuttle Program (SSP) currently requires trending and reporting only process
escapes to the SSP Quality Panel and SSP managers [ref. 18] [F.13, F.14]. The SSP
definitions of process escapes and process catches are inconsistent with the industrial and
human factors engineering terminology used in industry.
10.0 Definition of Terms
Corrective Actions Changes to design processes, work instructions, workmanship practices,
training, inspections, tests, procedures, specifications, drawings, tools,
equipment, facilities, resources, or material that result in preventing,
minimizing, or limiting the potential for recurrence of a problem.
Finding	 A conclusion based on facts established during the assessment/inspection
by the investigating authority.
Lessons Learned	 Knowledge or understanding gained by experience. The experience may
be positive, as in a successful test or mission, or negative, as in a mishap
or failure. A lesson must be significant in that it has real or assumed
impact on operations; valid in that it is factually and technically correct;
and applicable in that it identifies a specific design, process, or decision
that reduces or limits the potential for failures and mishaps, or reinforces a
positive result.
Observation	 A factor, event, or circumstance identified during the
assessment/inspection that did not contribute to the problem, but if left
uncorrected has the potential to cause a mishap, injury, or increase the
severity should a mishap occur.
Problem	 The subject of the independent technical assessment/inspection.
Recommendation	 An action identified by the assessment/inspection Team to correct a root
cause or deficiency identified during the investigation. The
NESC Request No.: NESC 07-005-E
^ :^ NASA Engineering and Safety Center Document#: Version:
- ^ ^ Technical Report RP-0^-4^ 1.0
Title: Page #:
STS-11^ Hail Damage Repair Assessment 51 of 113
recommendations may be used by the responsible C/P/P/O in the
preparation of a corrective action plan.
Root Cause	 Along a chain of events leading to a mishap or close call, the first causal
action or failure to act that could have been controlled systemically either
by policy/practice/procedure or individual adherence to
policy/practice/procedure.
11.0 List of Acronyms
AA Associate Administrator
CERB Chief Engineer’s Review Board
ET External Tank
GUCP Ground Umbilical Carrier Plate
ICD Interface Control Document
IFA In-Flight Anomaly
IFRs Ice Frost Ramps
IRT Independent Review Team
JSC Johnson Space Center
KSC Kennedy Space Center




MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center
MAF Michoud Assembly Facility
MMC Martin Marietta Corporation
MMT Mission Management Team
MR Material Review
MRB Material Review Board
NESC NASA Engineering & Safety Center
NCFI North Carolina Foam Institute
NSTS National Space Transportation System
OCE Office of Chief Engineer
OML Outer Mold Line
OMRS Operation and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications
PAL Protuberance Air Load
PDL Polymer Development Laboratory
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment
QC Quality Control
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S&MA	 Safety and Mission Assurance
SE&I Systems Engineering and Integration
SLA Super-Lightweight Ablator
SLWT Super Lightweight Tank
SOMD Space Operations Mission Directorate
SRB Solid Rocket Booster
SSME Space Shuttle Main Engine
SURFICE Surface Ice Tool
SSP Space Shuttle Program
TIM Technical Interchange Meeting
TPS Thermal Protection System
USA United Space Alliance
USI Use As Inspected
USR Use As Repaired
V&V Verification and Validation
VAB Vehicle Assembly Building
NESC Request No.: NESC 07-005-E
^ :^ NASA Engineering and Safety Center Document#: Version:
- ^ ^ Technical Report RP-07-47 1.0
Title: Page #:
STS-117 Hail Damage Repair Assessment 53 of 113
12.0 References
1. CERB Presentation Hail Damage Sampling Results, March 27, 2007
2. Cloudt ,Chris, Disler, John, and Evans, Cindy, STS-96 Hail Damage Repair Assessment,
KX, March 26, 2007
3. “Debris/Ice/TPS Assessment and Integrated Photographic Analysis of Shuttle Mission
STS-70,” NASA Technical Memorandum No. 110857, 1995.
4. “Debris/Ice/TPS Assessment and Integrated Photographic Analysis of Shuttle Mission
STS-96,” NASA Technical Memorandum, No. 208554, 1999.
5. ET-124 Hail Damage Crushed Foam Testing, 809-8807 Addendums 6, undated
6. ET-124 Hail Damage Crushed Foam Testing, 809-8807 Addendums 7/8, undated
7. ET-124 Hail Damage Testing, Addendum 10: LO2 Tank Hail Damage Hot Gas Test,
undated
8. ET Hail Damage Testing, 809-8807 Addendum 4, undated
9. ET Hail Damage TIM 3-14-06 pg35
10. Guillot, Michelle, Sand and Blend Critiera for ET Icing Zones, LM, April 12, 2007
11. Jeansonne, B. and Fontenot, M., ”Pencil Sharpender BX-265 Spray Demonstration »,
Apr 30, 07
12. Kaukler, STS-96 / ET-100 Hail Damage Assessment, Mar 07 and ET-100 Ogive Exam,
March 27, 2007
13. Kopfinger, Philip, “Hot Gas Testing of Crushed Foam,” Feb. 13, 2006
14. LM report 809-9600, Rev B
15. LO2 Tank Foam Losses, undated
16. Mission STS-96 OV-103 Flight 26 Thermal Protection System Post-Flight Assessment,
Boeing Internal Document, No. KLO-99-005, 1999.
17. Murphy, Terri, STS-96/ET100 Hail Damage Assessment Status, MS3, March 28, 2007
18. NSTS 08126, Rev K, July 2006
19. Paula, Sara de, “Thermal Vacuum Quick Look Evaluation of Working / Walking
Loads,” LMSSC / MAF, Feb. 20, 2006
20. Peters, James, ET-124 Readiness Status, Program Review Presentation, pg 21-24, April
10, 2007.
NESC Request No.: NESC 07-005-E
^ :^ NASA Engineering and Safety Center Document#: Version:
- ^ ^ Technical Report RP-07-47 1.0
Title: Page #:
STS-117 Hail Damage Repair Assessment 54 of 113
21. Peters, James, ET-124 Repair Risk Assessment, NASA SE&I, March 19, 2007
22. Phenolic / Machining Cutters and Drill Rods – SOFI (Tool Kit), 9 Jan 1991
23. Pilet, Jeff, “ET-124 Readiness Status, Program Review Presentation,” April 10, 2007
24. Pilet, Jeff, “ET Hail Damage IRT TPS Verification,” May 3, 2007
25. STS-117 SSV Hail Damage Status, May14, 2007
26. “STS-117 Hail Damage Initial Engineering Assessment IPR 117V-0092,” ET Program
Presentation, Feb. 27, 2007.
27. “STS-117 Hail Damage Recovery,” USA Ground Operations at KSC, May 4, 2007.
28. Rieckhoff, T.J., Covan, M., and O’Farrell, J.M., “Photographic Analysis Technique for
Assessing External Tank Foam Loss Events,” NASA/TM-2001.
NESC Request No.: NESC 07-005-E
^ :^ NASA Engineering and Safety Center Document#: Version:
- ^ ^ Technical Report RP-07-47 1.0
Title: Page #:
STS-117 Hail Damage Repair Assessment 55 of 113
Volume II: Appendices
A: NESC Request Form
B: Performance History of PDL Repairs and Crushed Foam
C: List of Documents, Tests and Analyses Reviewed by the NESC
D: (Resereved)
E: Process Demonstration for Multiple PDL Pours per Single Syringe Load
F: NESC Physically Based Non-Dimensionalization of Icing Probability
G: NESC Probability of Launch Based on Icing
H: NESC Cryogenic Moisture Uptake Core Study
I: NESC Expected PDL 1034 Mass Loss Assessment
J: Evaluation of the Inspection of Nose Cone, GH2 Pressurization Line Fairing, and
Intertank Access Door for ET 124
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Appendix B. Performance History of PDL Repairs and Crushed Foam
Table B-1 Performance History of PDL Repairs
At Divoting Depth Limit of
Source Description Conditions Results Assessment Largest Void
Internal void formation was deemed to be
809-9621 PDL 1034 Post-Columbia 101 horizontal low probability in horizontal applications, Critical depth for 0.5” cylinder
Application/Processing assessment of pre- pours and 49 but higher in vertical and overhead pour Points to 0.5” cylindrical is 0.8” deep and results in
Assessment V&V Columbia V&V vertical pours positions. The actual void size was not voids. 0.005 lbm divot assuming that
recorded but was below the 0.5 x 0.5” pre- the entire divot is PDL.
Columbia threshold.
Critical depth for 0.4” slot is
809-9972 Delta New Validation 50 from horizontal 0.8" and results in a 0.004Validation of Longeron Data with and 5 accepted 3 of the 5 accepted pours had voids Range of slot sizes. lbm divot from 0.1” slot, 0.005Plug Pull Restoration Dissections pours. Maximum found 0.4". lbm divot from 0.2” slot, andV&V 0.007 lbm divot from 0.3” slot
assuming entire divot is PDL.
809-9972 TPS
Process Assessment
Summary, Maximum Partial dissection 15 process cylindrical defects and 25 Largest process cylinder Critical depth for 0.7” cylinder
Expected Defect of TPS on 4 19 repairs process slot defects. Largest process was 0.7". Largest process is 0.9” deep and results in
Determination for Fly- external tanks dissected cylinder was 0.7". Largest process slot was slot was 0.4" 0.008 lbm divot assuming
As-Is ET TPS 0.4". entire mass is PDL.
Hardware Dissection
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At Divoting Depth Limit of
Source Description Conditions Results Assessment Largest Void
809-9440 TPS Geometric Cylinders = 1.5”
Process Assessment, Dissection data Processed Cylinders = .98”
Maximum Expected of PDL repairs of Geometric Slots = .84”





standard PDL Hot gas test Repaired and downstream areas showed Verification of standard
Recession of NCFI 24- Repairs acceptable performance PDL repair
124", 1997
No Test Report NCFI with Verification of standardNumber, " Standard PDL PDL repair. Verification ofWoodpecker Divot repairs and sand Hot gas test Normal recession - no debris generation sand and blend if damagedTesting in the and blends. 5
area is at bottom of sandImproved Hot Gas sand and blends and blend.Facility tested
NASA TM 110857,
“Debris/Ice/TPS Test panels withAssessment and
multiple PDL No significant debris loss or evidence of Verification of PDL repairsIntegrated






809-8807, “ET-124 ET-124 due to PDL requalified. Demonstrated acceptable Verification of PDL and
Crushed Foam new supplier. Hot gas test performance of multiple PDL and sand and sand and blend repairs inTesting”, Addendum 6, Test panels with blend repairs in the LO2 ascent areas having multiple
no date multiple PDL and environment. damage sites
sand and blend
repair areas.
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Table B-2 Performance History of Crushed Foam
Source Description Conditions Results Assessment
27 2.4” net NCFI
panels
ETTR-621, “Hail Steel balls used to
simulate hail 1” steel balls created 0.6” deep crushed foam at Shows that crushed foam existsDamage Simulation on Various angles of ambient bottom of cavity. Smaller than maximum STS-117 below visual zoneNCFI24-124” incidence hail size.
Also machined
panels
809-9910, Thermal Crushed foam viaVacuum Testing of
walking loads No debris loss from damaged areas. 300# load Limited – invisible damage zonesCrushed Foam with through the walking vacuum/ IR applied over large area (~4"Ф ). on ET-124 are caused by a veryCryogenic Backface,”
mats different processApr, 2006
6 net spray and
machined iNCFI
809-9954, “Thermal panels, each with 6
Evaluation of Crushed crush regions – 3 Single foam loss from 20% crush area on machined Single foam loss event fromET TPS in the 1x1/2” ellipses and 3 Hot gas panel. Crush mechanism may not be same as for
crushed foamImproved Hot Gas 4” circles, crush hail
Facility,” Apr 2006. depth 5, 15, and
20%
Also BX, PDL
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Source Description Conditions Results Assessment
809-9890, “Red Dye Net spray NCFI
and Shearography panels subjected toEvaluation as
crush loads from 4" Limited –this was a detection testDetermination by diameter disk. ambient NCFI is sensitive to crushing but it did show that NCFI isTensile Strength of Also Machined vulnerable to crushingCrushed Foam, ”May panels, BX, PDL2006.
6 net spray NCFI
panels, each with 6
809-8603, “Thermal crush regions – 3
Vacuum Testing: 1x1/2” ellipses and 3
Recession 4” circles with Vacuum/IR Normal recession – no debris generation. Crush Some relevance to undetectedCharacterization of radiused edges, mechanism not be same as for hail - speed damage
Crushed TTPS,” May slow crush depth 5,
2006. 15, and 20%. Also
Machined panels,
BX, PDL
1.2” thick net spray
809-9954, “IFA, AC-14, NCFI panels
Quick Look, Evaluation subjected to slow
vacuum/IR Foam losses from panels with disk loads of 150 Two divoting events from crushedof Working-Walking crush loads from 3” and 200 lbs. Load applied slowly over large area foam
Loads diameter disk and 4”
sphere
5 net spray NCFI
809-9655, “Ice/frost panels 1” and 2” Ice/frost can result from damagedCharacterization
°
deep crushes (25 /o Ice formed at crushed foam foamtesting” and 15%,
respectively)
Source: Wilson, T., "NESC STS-117 Hail Damage Repair Assessment, Project Status," Mar 21, 2007.
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Appendix C. List of Documents, Tests and Analyses Reviewed by the NESC
Document Type Document Description Document Impacted Date Last
Updated
Overview
Presentation Presentation summarizing the Overview Briefing Info Only 4/27/07
damage, repair approach and
verification
Applicable Documents
Level 77 Flight and Ground System NSTS 07700 Volume X – Book 1 Info Only 4/27/07
Requirement Specification
Level 77 Ice/Debris Inspection Criteria NSTS 08303 Info Only 4/27/07
Requirement
Level 77 Expected Debris Generation NSTS 60559 Info Only 4/27/07
Requirement and Impact Tolerance
Requirements, Groundrules,
and Assumptions
ICD Moldline & Protuberances ICD ICD-2-00001 Info Only 4/27/07
ICD Space Shuttle/Launch Pad & ICD-2-0A002 Info Only 4/27/07
Platform ICD possible
Level 77 OMRSD Requirements - NSTS 08171 – File IV - ET Info Only 4/28/07
Requirement Operation & Maintenance OMRDSs
Requirements & Specification File II Vol 1, Vol 3, Vov 4
Document
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Level II LCC - Launch Commit Criteria NSTS 16007 – Section 17 – Info Only 4/28/07
Requirement External Tank Subsystems
Environments Documentation of Mission SE&I Thermal Environments Info Only 5/2/07
Specific Heating for Launch (available on request)
Probability
End Item ET Contract End Item CPTO1M09A, END ITEM (CEI) Info Only 4/28/07
SPECIFICATION - PART ISpecification Specification
(EIS)
Verification Plan ET requirement verification TM01 Info Only 4/28/07
plan
Affected Documents
Level II Applicable Environments Thermal Environments – no No 5/2/07
Requirements Changes change
End Item Revisions to Contract End Item N/A No 5/2/07
Specification Specification
(EIS)









FMEA/CIL Changes to baseline / violations CIL Item Monitorng Discussion Impacted 4/27/07
as the result of ET-124 repair
ICD Changes to baseline / violations Waiver IRN if required TBD ECD ?
as the result of ET-124 repair Impact will be
pending final
assessment of
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As-Built
OMRSD Changes to baseline / violations N/A No 4/27/07
as the result of ET-124 repair
LCC Changes to baseline / violations N/A No 4/27/07
as the result of ET-124 repair
Hazards Changes to baseline / violations • 	 T.02 - Loss of ET Thermal Impacted 5/02/07
as the result of ET-124 repair Planning update –Protection System (changes)




MUAs 393D Updated MUA for PDL 1034 Info Only 4/27/07
(NCFI 26-007)
MUAs 0421 C Updated MUA for BX-265 Info Only 4/27/07
Required Testing
Test Plan / Report Changes to TPS materials - Plan Impacted 4/28/07
PDL-1034 (NCFI 26-007)
• 	 MS-06-040
• 	 MS-06-040 Rev 1




Test Plan / Report Changes to TPS materials – Plan Impacted 4/28/07
BX-265 (Polyol source change)
•
	 809-8600 Rev AQualification test plan/report
• 	 809-8600 Rev A Add 1
• 	 809-8600 Rev A Add 2
Report
• 	 809-8601 R1
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Forward Ogive Repair Testing




• 	 Flash Report
Test Plan / Report Hot Gas Testing Plan Impacted 4/28/07
• 	 809-8804
• 	 809-8804 Amendment 1
• 	 809-8804 Amendment 2
Report
• 	 809-8805
• 	 Flash Report
Repair Testing 809-8807
Combined Flash Report – All Addenda
Test Plan / Report Addendum 1, Sand and Blend • 	 809-8807, Add. 1 (Plan) Impacted 4/28/07
Test
• 	 809-8808 - ET 124 HAIL Report ECD ?
DAMAGE CRUSHED
FOAM TESTING –
Addendum 1 Sand & Blend
Thermal Testing (Report)
Test Plan / Report Addendum 2, Hail Damage • 	 809-8807, Add. 2 (Plan) Impacted 4/28/07
Simulation
• 	 809-8836 - ET 124 HAIL Report ECD ?
DAMAGE CRUSHED
FOAM TESTING –
Addendum 2 Hail Damage
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Simulation (Report)
Test Plan / Report Addendum 3, Intertank Hot Gas • 	 809-8807, Add. 3 (Plan) Impacted 4/28/07
Recession Test
• 	 809-8837 - ET 124 HAIL Report ECD ?
DAMAGE CRUSHED
FOAM TESTING –
Addendum 3 Intertank Hail
Damage Hot Gas Test
(Report)
Test Plan / Report Addendum 4, Dynamic vs • 	 809-8807, Add. 4 (Plan) Impacted 4/28/07
Static Foam Crushing Test
• 	 809-8838 - ET 124 HAIL Report ECD ?
DAMAGE CRUSHED
FOAM TESTING –
Addendum 4 Dynamic vs.
Static Crushed Foam Hot Gas
Test (Report)
Test Plan / Report Addendum 5, Barely Visible • 	 809-8807, Add. 5 (Plan) Impacted 4/28/07
Damage “BVD” Hot Gas Test
•
	 809-8839 - ET 124 HAIL Report ECD ?
DAMAGE CRUSHED
FOAM TESTING –
Addendum 5 Barely Visible
Damage Hot Gas Test
(Report)
Test Plan / Report Addendum 6, PDL Repair Hot • 	 809-8807, Add. 6 (Plan) Impacted 4/28/07
Gas Test
• 	 809-8807, Add. 6 A1 (Plan) Report ECD5/6
• 	 809-9940 - ET 124 HAIL
DAMAGE CRUSHED
FOAM TESTING –
Addendum 6 PDL Repair Hot
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Gas Test (Report)
Test Plan / Report Addendum 7 & 8, Barely • 	 809-8807, Add. 7/8 (Plan) Impacted 4/28/07
Visible Damage “BVD” Icing
•
	 809-8841 - ET 124 HAIL Report ECD
and PDL Thermal Vac Test DAMAGE CRUSHED 5/11
FOAM TESTING –
Addendum 7/8 Barely Visible
Damage / PDL Repair
Thermal Vac Test (Report)
Test Plan / Report Addendum 9, Intertank Thermal • 	 809-8807, Add. 9 (Plan) Impacted 4/28/07
Test





Thermal Vac Test (Report)
Test Plan / Report Addendum 10, Hot Gas Test • 	 809-8807, Add. 10 (Plan) Impacted 4/28/07
• 	 809-8843 - ET 124 HAIL Report ECD ?
DAMAGE CRUSHED
FOAM TESTING –
Addendum 10 LO2 Tank Hail
Damage Hot Gas Test
(Report)
Plug Pull Failure Testing - Cat 3
Test Plan / Report Test #2: Plug pull re-core LWR #21958 Impacted 05/02/07
Flash Report Report ECD 5/7
Test Plan / Report Test #3: Insecticide LWR #21953 Impacted 05/02/07
Flash Report Report ECD 5/7
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Related Analyses
Analysis Results Thermal Analysis - Launch Probability Impacted 05/03/07
Documentation of analysis
• 	 4140/T-07-3016 - Assessment
results that support the as-built
of Launch Probability with
configuration ET-124 Hail Damage
Icing Test Results
• 	 4140/T-07-3017 - Sand/Blend
Criteria for Icing for ET-124
Repair Assessments for the
LO2 Tank
Heat Leaks
• 	 4140/T-07-3013 -
Documentation of LO2 Heat
Leak Assessment for ET-124
Hail Damage
LO2 acreage
• 	 4140/T-07-3014 - Request for
Stress Assessment of LO2
Tank Temperatures for ET-
124 Hail Damage
Pencil Sharpener Repair
• 	 4140/T-07-3008 - Thermal
Analysis of Pencil Sharpener
Repair at Station 372 on ET-
124
Pencil Sharpener Repair
• 	 4140/T-07-3018 - ET-124
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Hail Damage LO2 Ogive
Structural Temperature at XT
387 with BX/NCFI Repair
Pencil Sharpener Repair
•	 4140/T-07-3021 - ET-124
Hail Damage LO2 Ogive
Structural Gradients for Divot




Aerothermal Testing of the
BX-265 over NCFI 24-124
Forward Ogive Machined
Area (Pencil Sharpener Area)
Repair Due to Hail Damage
on ET-124
Intertank-structure
•	 4140/T-07-3012 - Thermal




•	 4140/T-07-3020 - ET Reentry
Analysis for ET-124 LO2
Tank Hail Damage
Methodology for Cavities
•	 4140/T-07-3010 - Sand/Blend
NESC Request No.: NESC 07-005-E
^ :^ NASA Engineering and Safety Center Document#: Version:
- ^ ^ Technical Report RP-0^-4^ 1.0
Title: Page #:
STS-11^ Hail Damage Repair Assessment 71 of 113
Criteria for Heating for ET-
124 Thermal Analysis
Assessments
Analysis Results Stress Analysis - 4130-07-01 - ET 124 Hail Damage Impacted ECD
Documentation of analysis LO2 Tank Structural Assessment
results that support the as-built 4130-07-02 - ET 124 Hail Damage
configuration Intertank Structural Assessment
4130-07-03 - ET 124 Hail Damage
Composite Assessments
Analysis Results Propulsion Analysis - 4160/P-07-4002 - Assessment of Impacted 05/03/07
Documentation of analysis ET-124 Minimum Foam Thickness
results that support the as-built Requirements on LO2 Tank Ullage
design Pressure and EOR Propellant Load
Other Information
Historical Documents
Review Data ET-124 Hail Damage TIM #1 ET-124 Hail Damage Technical Info Only 5/02/07
Interchange Meeting 3/14/07
Presentations – ET-124 Hail Damage TSC / TSC Briefings Info Only 4/28/07
TSC / CERB CERB briefings 4/5/07 ET-124 Component
Dispositions
4/5/07 Spray Demonstration results
CERB Briefings




3/12/07 Red Dye and crushed foam
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3/27/07 ET-124 PDL Repair
Reduction
3/27/07 ET-124 Hail Damage
Sampling Results
3/27/07 Planned Testing to
Support Disposition of ET-124
Hail Damage
3/27/07 ET-124 LO2 Tank
Temperature Assessment
3/27/07 LO2 Tank TPS Thickness
requirements delta
3/27/07 ET-124 TPS Repair
Impacts to STS-117 LO2 Tank
EOR Propellant Load – PSIG
3/27/07 Thermal Sand and Blend
criteria for icing
3/27/07 ET-124 LO2 Tank
Thickness Map Mission specific
3/27/07 ET-124 New BX Spray
3/27/07 ET-124 Intertank
Assessment Plan
4/12/07 809-8804 Hot Gas Brief
Report
4/12/07 ET-124 Sand and Blend
Criteria for Icing
4/18/07 ET Pencil Sharpener
NESC Request No.: NESC 07-005-E
^ :^ NASA Engineering and Safety Center Document#: Version:
- ^ ^ Technical Report RP-0^-4^ 1.0
Title: Page #:
STS-11^ Hail Damage Repair Assessment 73 of 113
Repair demo testing update
4/18/07 Hail Damage Testing
update





replacement) TSC / CERB
briefings
01/11/07 TSC: Review NCFI -007 Info Only 4/30/07
(PDL-1034) material qualification
test data
03/06/07 TSC: Review NCFI-007
(PDL-007) material qualification
test data





BX-265 re-qualification TSC /
CERB briefings
11/30/06 TSC: Review chemical Info Only 4/30/07
and mechanical property data of
BX-265 material with Polyol
source change
01/08/07 TSC: Review BX-265
material with Polyol source change
hot gas test data
02/16/07 TSC: Review BX-265
Lot 1 Thermal Vac Thermal
Conductivity data and Lot
2Mechanical and Hot Gas
03/20/07 TSC: Review BX Lot 2
Thermal Vac and Thermal
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Conductivity data
MPP AFT OGIVE HAIL DAMAGE ARK07014M10 Rev 2 Info Only 4/28/07
BX-265 REPAIR @ KSC (ET-
124)
(Montana demonstration)
MPP FWD OGIVE HAIL DAMAGE ARK07014K1 Rev 2 Info Only 4/28/07
BX-265 REPAIR @ KSC (ET-
124)
Reference Info ET-124 Hail Damage Repair ET-124 Repair Data by Type Info Only 5/02/07
Data
Repair Summary ET-124 Hail damage PDL
repair calculations
Defect Data Summary Info Only 4/30/07
Reference Info Environment Update Process PRCBD CR S071024LW Info Only 4/30/07
Induced Environments Transmittal
Process
Reference Info ET Project - Design Values for
Non-Metallic Materials
809-9600 Info Only 4/30/07
Reference Info Foam Losses LO2 Acreage Foam Loss Summary Info Only 5/01/07
Reference Info Composite Intertank Door
Ultrasonic Inspection Results
Report 2007-CB-01 Info Only 5/02/07
Reference Info Composite GH2 Pressline
Fairing Ultrasonic Inspection
Report 2007-CB-02 Info Only 5/02/07
Results
Reference Info Thermography of the
Composite Nose Cone on ET-
Report 2007-CB-03 Info Only 5/02/07
124
Presentation – ET-124 Hail Damage ET-124 Hail Damage Assessment Info Only 5/03/07
and Verification ApproachNASA Senior Assessment and Verification
Management Approach Presentation
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Review
Actions for Reference
ET PRCBD Actions PRCBD S063595B (1-1) - ET PRCBD S063595B and Response Info Only 4/30/07
Foam Minimum Thickness (Planned Presentation to SICB on Response ECD
Requirements (STS-117) – 5/8) 5/8
Perform a LOX Tank heat leak
assessment based on the final
repair configuration of ET-124.
Report to the SICB.
SEPARs Transmittal of request to All SEPARS with attachments Info Only 4/30/07
perform repair (from LM / KSC (available on request)
to USA / KSC)
Action Requests Transmittal of defect All ARs Info Only 4/30/07
disposition and rationale for (available on request)
acceptance of disposition (from
LM / MAF to LM / KSC)
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Appendix D. (Reserved)
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Appendix E. Process Demonstration for Multiple PDL Pours per
Single Syringe Load
On March 26 and March 27, 2007, USA performed two “process demonstrations” consisting of
PDL pours on BX-265 foam test panels mounted vertically in a different area of the VAB than
the actual ET work area. The primary goal of the demonstration was to develop and validate a
revised method of PDL repairs using multiple PDL pours from a single syringe loaded with PDL
foam. The intent of the new method was to increase overall efficiency of the repair process
without sacrificing quality. The efficiency increase was desirable in order to get the repairs to a
“production mode” that would support the milestones in the repair schedule. The results of the
process demonstration were summarized in a United Space Alliance (USA) white paper provided
to NESC on April 16, 2007.
TPSB SS20-613 and TPSB SS20-614 were the procedures developed to support the PDL pours
in two test panels with 17 holes each. The process demonstration verified the methods for the
production mode of PDL repairs at KSC.
The stated purpose of TPSB SS20-613 was to “verify PDL cream time in the VAB environment
and determine syringe size and multiple holes proficiency.” (reference: USA white paper, April
16, 2007 ). The results of the TPSB SS20-613 procedure included the following:
- Determined a 1.7 cc of PDL foam in the syringe per cubic inch of estimated repair
volume
- Determined that 3 holes in close proximity was the limit for one syringe
- Selected the 10 cc syringe size to support a three-hole injection
- Verified the PDL cream time supported the syringe method and a three-hole injection
series
During TPSB SS20-613, mold failures were experienced from foam lifting the mold off the ET
surface, which raised concerns regarding sub-surface voids. As a result, only hard molds were
allowed in the repair methods. A double ring of sealant tape (“dum dum” putty) was also used to
secure the hard mold to the ET. The sealant tape was a contributor to rework activities (i.e. sand
and blend) when removal of the tape also lifted some of the surface ET foam (the “rind”) during
mold removals.
The stated purpose of TPSB SS20 614 was to “demonstrate the multiple holes pour and to verify
injection parameters and that lessons learned (from TPSB SS20 613) were incorporated”
(reference: USA white paper, April 16, 2007)) into the final PDL repair procedure. Specific
objectives of this demonstration included verifying that the subsurface void criteria were not
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violated and verifying technician proficiency (in addition to the proficiency already
demonstrated during the proficiency already demonstrated during the certification/recertification
process). The results of the TPSB SS20-614 procedure included the following:
17 of 17 test PDL repairs were free of subsurface voids. One of 17 repairs was an under
fill.
Verified by dissection that no subsurface void criteria (0.5 inch maximum) was violated
on all test samples.
“Buy copies” of TPSB SS20-613 and TPSB SS20-614 were provided to NESC. No dissection
measurements or photographs were collected as part of TPSB SS20-613 or TPSB SS20-614.
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Appendix F. NESC Physically Based Non-Dimensionalization of
Icing Probability
Rationale
The External Tank Project devised a method of sorting the hail damage locations into deeper-
than-normal sand and blend (S&B) and PDL repairs with a goal of minimizing the number of
PDL repairs on the tank. This sorting was performed by identifying the icing potential of each
prospective S&B repair. Those that had an icing probability of greater than 15 percent for a May
through October launch were selected by the project to be repaired using PDL. To enable this
sorting, the project set up an icing test in a natural convection chamber. A box fan was included
in the test to allow for some forced convection. Liquid nitrogen-backed foamed panels with
cavities of different depths and shapes were tested to identify the icing limits.
The results of the testing are shown in Figure J-1 along with the 327 damage locations included
in the sorting. The line labeled as “test derived with wind” was developed directly from the
tipping points identified in the icing tests. It was used to sort the repair sites into PDL and S&B,
resulting in 26 suggested PDL repairs and 301 S&B repairs. Also, 3 repairs that fell into the
S&B region were re-designated as PDL by the ET Project owing to a feeling of increased icing
risk at these locations and depths.
A NESC preliminary investigation of the historic at KSC weather indicated that the 15 percent
icing probability (85 percent launch probability) cutoff most likely coincided with wind speeds
that would cause the heat transfer on the LO 2 ogive to be dominated by forced convection. This
raised an issue with directly using the results of a natural convection test with limited forced
convection to assess icing in the forced convection dominated launch conditions. In addition, it
was noted that the sorting criteria did not take into account the fact that the new minimum foam
thickness is 0.8 inch in the no-ice zone vs. 0.6 inch in the ice limitation zone. Therefore, the
icing potential of the prospective S&B repairs on all zones of the tank cannot be represented
using defect depth and foam thickness as the sole variables. Because of these factors, the NESC
performed a physics-based non-dimensionalization of the icing potential to allow the relative
icing potential of all prospective S&B repairs to be assessed.
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Baseline estimate from preliminary test data assessment = 26
	
0.7	 Test-derived with wind: 25 + 3 additional in no-ice zone = 28
Test-derived without wind: 110
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improve margin in no-ice zone
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Figure F1 - Sand/Blend Criteria for Ice Zones (from Sand and Blend Criteria for ET-124
Icing Zones, Michelle Guillot. April 12, 2007
Physics-Based Non-Dimensionalization
For foam on the oxygen tank at the minimum thickness, t min, for a given ambient temperature,
T^
 , there is a value of the nominal convective coefficient, h nominal, below which unacceptable
icing can occur. This defines a critical surface temperature, T surface,critical. The physical case is
shown in Figure J-1.
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Figure F-2 – Physical Layout of Foam Heat Transfer
The heat transfer through the foam can be characterized by the thermal resistances shown in
Figure J-2. Here, keff is the effective thermal conductivity of the foam and A is a characteristic
surface area perpendicular to the heat transfer path.
Figure F-3 –Thermal Resistances at the Minimum Foam Thickness
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To maintain the same icing probability as a large flat area at the minimum thickness, the surface
temperature at the bottom of a sand and blend must be greater than or equal to critical surface
temperature. A one-dimensional analysis allows the thermal resistances to the bottom of the
cavity to be represented as shown in Figure J-3, where t is the foam thickness and h is the
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Figure F-4 – One-Dimensional Thermal Resistances at the Bottom of a Cavity
To maintain the same critical surface temperature for different foam thicknesses, the ratio of the
two thermal resistances, R1/R2 must be the same in the two cases. This yields the following











This result is independent of ambient temperature, the critical surface temperature, and the
nominal heat transfer coefficient. If the convective coefficient at the bottom of the cavity is
higher than the value calculated by eqn. (1), the icing potential is less than for a flat surface at the
minimum foam thickness. Conversely, if the coefficient is lower than this value, there is a
higher icing potential than for a flat surface at the minimum foam thickness.
At wind speeds exceeding 2 knots, the Reynolds number at the ogive exceeds 5x10 5 and the heat
transfer mechanism on the tank surface is turbulent forced convection. In this case we might
expect that the convective coefficient at the bottom of a cavity would be characterized by
n the local convection coefficient over a nearby flat surface
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n the cavity depth
n the cavity width
n the cavity shape.
Buckingham’s Pi theorem suggests that we could express the relation in dimensionless form as
h h 










Buckingham’s Pi theorem says that h/hnominal can be expressed as a single valued function of ^,/d,
but does not tell us anything about the shape of the curve. However, the physics of the airflow in
the cavity suggest that for large values of ^,/d, the cavity approximates a flat surface and h/hnominal
approaches unity. As ^,/d decreases, the cavity becomes relatively steeper, reducing the airflow
in the cavity, and reducing h/hnominal.
The ET Project Test Results
The ET Project test-based recommendations are plotted using the appropriate dimensionless
groups in Figure 5. The y-axis is the repair-specific convective coefficient ratio calculated from
eqn. 1 that must be maintained to yield the same surface temperature as for a flat surface at the
same thickness. Several conclusions are apparent from the figure. First, the ET recommended
PDL repairs3 are clustered where the sand and blend repair would be deep and steep (low l/d)
and would need to maintain a high fraction of the flat surface heat transfer. Second, the three
additional recommended PDL repairs4 are in a region where many other locations are also
recommended for PDL repair. Third, there is some overlap between the recommendations for
S&B and PDL repair.
3 Labeled “ET PDL” in the Figure 5.
4 Labeled “ET Extended PDL” in Figure 5
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Figure F-5 – ET Project Test-Based Repair Recommendation
To address the repair method overlap, a cutoff line was drawn encompassing all the ET Project-
recommended PDL repairs as shown in Figure J-6. The line has the expected upward slope as
discussed in the previous section.
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Figure F-6 – Repair Sorting and Recommended Augmentation
Figure J-6 also shows 11 repairs that were recommended as S&B by the ET Project that are
above the dividing line and thus have icing potential that exceeds that of sites that had been
designated for PDL repair. The NESC recommended to the project that these sites also be
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Appendix G. NESC Probability of Launch Based on Icing
Rationale
The NESC was concerned that, because tests that were not representative of the launch pad heat
transfer physics were used to establish the PDL vs. S&B repair cutoff , the launch probability
due to icing could be substantially less than the 85percent May to October requirement. To
address this concern, the NESC performed a sensitivity analysis of the heat transfer in the sand
and blend repairs using a 30 year KSC weather dataset.
Method
The first step in performing the sensitivity analysis was to obtain the LO 2 ogive average heat
transfer coefficient as a function of wind speed using HPSim 5 , the ET Project certified heat
transfer coefficient calculation tool. Using 75°F 6 as the ambient temperature, the ogive heat
transfer coefficient was calculated for a range of wind speeds. The result is shown in Figure 1.
Wind Speed (knots)
Figure G-1 – Ogive Heat Transfer Coefficient, 75°F Ambient Temperature
5 HPSim Rev F, Lockheed Martin Michoud Space Systems
6 75°F is an approximate average for the ambient temperature at KSC between May and October.
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The flat region at low wind speeds in Figure 1 is the natural convection region. At wind speeds
above 1.5 knots, forced convection heat transfer dominates. Because the heat transfer coefficient
in the dominant forced convection regime is not a strong function of ambient temperature, the
HPSim output was curve fit to provide a single valued function of ogive convection coefficient
as a function of wind speed.
The thermal resistance network for heat transfer on the ogive with a convective boundary
condition is shown in Figure K-2. Here A is a representative area, t is the foam thickness, h is the
convective coefficient, keff is the effective foam thermal conductivity, Tsurface is the foam outer
surface temperature, and T is the ambient temperature.
_ t ^	
R 1
 k eff A
 : R 2




Figure G-2 – Thermal Resistance Network for Ogive Heat Transfer




 keff 32  297 F	 (1)
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The corresponding convective heat transfer is
q   h  T 
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If the convective heat transfer is higher than the value in eqn. (2), the higher heat transfer will
drive the surface temperature above the freezing point. Therefore, we can use the quantity F as
an icing indicator where
F = h(T^ — 32pF	 (3)
A 30 year KSC weather data base was obtained from MAF. This database includes hourly
observations of ambient temperature and wind speed. For each observation in the database, the
convective coefficient curve fit was used to calculate a value of F. The results were then sorted
on F. This allowed us to find the value of F that coincides with 15percent icing probability
(85percent launch probability) and to assess the probability distribution of F.
The sorted wind speed measurements are shown in Figure 3. Three lines are plotted for 3
separate data subsets owing to Excel limitations. The wind speed probability shows the 1.5 knot








wind (knots) 1957 - 1969
wind (knots) 1970 - 1982
wind (knots) 1983 - 1987
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Figure G-3 – May to October Wind speed at KSC
The probability distribution of the icing parameter, F is shown in Figure K-4. Here, also, the
data is broken into three data subsets owing to Excel limitations. A single black line is faired
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through the three data subsets. The value of F that coincides with an 85percent icing launch
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Figure G-4 – Icing Parameter, F – May to October at KSC
The choice between sand and blend repairs and PDL repairs for different hail damage locations
was made based on a presumed relationship between the dimensions of the sand and blend cavity
and the heat transfer at the bottom of the cavity as was detailed in Appendix F. Figure K-5
shows the selected relationship as a diagonal black line. If this line reflects the relationship
between the fraction of flat surface convective coefficient and the geometry parameter, we have
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Figure G-5 – Relationship Used to Discriminate between Sand and Blend and PDL Repairs
Figure 4 gives us a method of assessing the launch probability sensitivity to the location of the
dividing line in Figure 5. If dividing line is off by a factor of 2, the critical value of F on a flat
surface would need to double to prevent icing above the 15percent probability level. Figure 4
shows that if we select the critical value of F as 60 (2x the nominal 15percent level), the icing
probability is less than 45percent (and the launch probability still exceeds 55percent). Therefore,
we conclude that the selected sand and blend criteria yields a relatively robust icing launch
probability.
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Appendix H. NESC Cryogenic Moisture Uptake Core Study
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Appendix I. NESC Expected PDL 1034 Mass Loss Assessment
Summary
One of the facets of the flight rationale for STS-117 is the probability risk assessment (PRA).
This assessment uses a Monte Carlo technique to calculate the risk to the Orbiter from the
expected level of ascent debris. Once the 900+ PDL 1034 repairs were completed on the tank,
the values for the maximum expected ascent foam loss from each repair could be developed.
The ET Project developed a database of maximum expected foam loss from the PDL 1034
repairs using the following procedure:
1. The mass of each PDL 1034 repair was calculated from the repair height, width, and
length assuming a brick shaped repair.
2. The database was sorted to retain only the repairs with masses greater than 0.004 lbm, the
Orbiter deterministic foam debris limit.
3. The maximum expected divot mass was then calculated using the maximum expected
cylindrical defect7
 placed at either its maximum devoting depth or the depth of the repair,
whichever was less.
The result was a list of 86 divots from the 900+ repairs with masses ranging from 0.006 to
0.028 lbm.
The NESC was concerned that this calculation technique did not include the fact that repairs of
less than 0.004 lbm can throw divots greater than 0.004 lbm owing to the angle of the divot cone.
Also, it was not clear whether the possibility of slot defects had been included in the ET Project’s
calculation.
Therefore, the NESC repeated the ET Project analysis with two critical differences:
1. All PDL 1034 repairs were evaluated for divoting.
2. Both slot and cylinder voids were assessed.
The resulting list of maximum expected slot and cylinder divots for each location was then
sorted for the maximum expected (i. e., whether from a slot or cylinder). Of the 900+ PLD 1034
repairs, 747 could generate divots larger than 0.004 lbm deterministic limit - a number
substantially larger than the 86 generated by the ET Project. The NESC recommended to the
Space Shuttle Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) Office that the NESC method be
used to capture the maximum expected divot masses from the PDL 1034 repairs. The SE&I
Office accepted the recommendation.
7 The maximum expected defect is assessed from the available dissection data. The maximum void size observed in
the dissections is increased by 40% to obtain the maximum expected defect.
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Method
The pressure difference between a sealed void and the external atmosphere cause a divot to occur
during the Space Shuttle’s ascent. This void-delta p divoting mechanism was studied extensively
during the post-Columbia return to flight effort. Divot/No-Divot curves were developed from
test data from each type of foam on the External Tank that could be used to predict the maximum
divoting depth for any sized void of the two characteristic void types, slots and cylinders.
Once the 900+ PDL 1034 repairs were completed on ET 124, the length, width, and depth were
known for each repair. This geometry information, the maximum expected size of cylinder and
slot defects, plus the Divot/No-Divot curves could be used to calculate the maximum expected
void size.
The detailed methodology used for cylindrical defects was:
1. The cylindrical defect diameter taken as 1.5 inches (the maximum expected diameter) or
the largest repair dimension (length or width), whichever was smaller.
2. The void depth was set at either the repair depth or its maximum divoting depth
according to the cylinder Divot/No-Divot curve, whichever was smaller.
3. The divot volume was calculated using a frustum with cone angle of 30 ° from the foam
free surface as recommended by the ET Project. The minimum frustum diameter was the
cylindrical defect diameter.
4. The divot mass was calculated using the ET Project provided PDL 1034 density of
3.44 lbm/ft3.
The detailed methodology used for slot defects was:
1. The slot length was taken as largest repair dimension (length or width).
2. The slot defect diameter was taken as 0.84 inches (the maximum expected diameter) or
the length/2.4, whichever was smaller8.
3. The void depth was set at either the repair depth or its maximum divoting depth
according to the slot Divot/No-Divot curve, whichever was smaller.
4. The divot volume was calculated using a translated frustum with cone angle of 45 ° from
the foam free surface as recommended by the ET Project. The minimum frustum
diameter was the slot defect diameter. The full length of the solid was the slot length.
5. The divot mass was calculated using the ET Project provided PDL 1034 density of
3.44 lbm/ft3.
The cylinder and slot divot masses each PDL 1034 repair were then compared to determine
whether the maximum divot mass was the result of a slot or cylinder defect. The largest mass
was selected for reporting9.
8 At length/diameter ratios less than 2.4, a slot is considered to be a cylinder.
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Figure L-1 plots the divot masses generated by the ET Project analysis and the NESC analysis.
Even the figure shows that a very large number of possible divots greater than the deterministic
limit of 0.004 lbm are not calculated are by the ET Project’s algorithm.
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Figure I-1 - Maximum Expected Divot Masses Using the Two Algorithms
Figure L-2 plots sorted defect masses greater than 0.004 lbm obtained by the two algorithms.
The figure shows the additional smaller masses between 0.004 and 0.010 lbm that are captured
by the NESC method.
9 The slot void yielded the highest mass for only four of the repairs assessed, cylindrical defects yielded the largest
masses for the remainder.
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Figure L-2 – Sorted Divot Masses
Using the NESC method allows all the maximum expected divots that exceed 0.004 lbm to be
captured, generating the most accurate possible input to the PRA. The NESC recommended to
the Space Shuttle Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) Office that the NESC method be
used to capture the maximum expected divot masses from the PDL 1034 repairs. The SE&I
Office accepted the recommendation.
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Appendix J. Evaluation of the Inspection of Nose Cone, GH2
Pressurization Line Fairing, and Intertank Access Door for ET 124
Summary:
Inspection of the ET 124 Composite Nose Cone at KSC using the MSFC Thermal Wave Imaging
(TWI) thermography system was of better quality than the original inspection for manufacturing
acceptance. This is because the original acceptance used a thermography system with a poorer
resolution and sensivity. Inspectors were as well qualified and certified as those that performed
the original acceptance inspection. Access to the Nose Cone was adequate to allow complete
inspection. The critical initial flaw size (CIFS) was large in comparison to the damage in the
NDE calibration impact damage coupons used to verify detection capability of the thermography
system. During initial development, the capability of the Nose Cone to perform adequately with
an included CIFS defect was verified by a damage tolerance test program prior to incorporating
the Composite Nose Cone on the External Tank. Impact of a critical level would leave a visible
dent on the surface of the Nose Cone. No visible indications were found upon visual
examination of the Nose Cone. The thermography images from the inspection were reviewed an
additional time by two more MSFC inspectors with no reportable indications found.
Inspection of the GH2 Pressurization Line Fairing, and Intertank Access Door for ET 124 used
hand held ultrasonic inspection. No review of data was possible as none was stored during the
inspection. The initial acceptance inspection for the Pressurization Line Fairing was also hand
held ultrasonic inspection. So the reinspection of this part was of similar quality to the initial
acceptance inspection. However, the initial acceptance inspection of the Intertank Access Door
uses a better quality inspection, C-scan ultrasound. This fact needs to be considered for
relevance for the flight worthiness decision.
Information on the inspection of the metal louver of the Nose Cone has been requested from
Lockheed Martin MAF. An assessment of this inspection will be added at a later date.
Supporting Material:
The thermography images taken during the ET Nose Cone inspection were reviewed by Joseph
Ragasa and Sam Russell on May 22 and 23, 2007.
A Telecom with Carl Bouvier occurred on May 10, 2007 and James Walker joined me in my
office.
On the ET Nose Cone
Mr. Bouvier and Mr. Walker conducted the thermography inspection on March 17 and 18, 2007.
Mr. Ricky Clements represented SM&A and assisted in moving the inspection head and tripods.
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Visual inspection of the three ET parts was performed by Kevin Vega (NASA), Ahmad Ekhlassi
(USA), and Carl Bouvier (LM MAF) on March 6 2007.
Mr. Bouvier has level III certification in ultrasonic and thermography inspection. He has passed
a recent vision test using the Jaeger 2 at 12” or more method.
The MSFC owned Thermal Wave Imaging (TWI) Flash thermography System was used. This
system uses a FLIR Phoenix camera with 25 mm lens, TWI lamps, TWI computer, and TWI
Echotherm 6.2 software used. Image subtraction of preflash was used. The Phoenix camera has
thermal sensivity of 0.02 degrees K, and an Indium Antimonide 640 X 512 pixels array detector
operating to detect 3-5 micro meter infrared light. Full sequence of tw2 images was stored at
each inspection location.
The Nose Cone had been dry dusted with a cloth prior to beginning inspection.
No coating for emissivity control was used. The finish was the normal as processed finish.
Metal tape indicators marked 7” x 7” grids.
Four NDE coupons made from an early non-production Nose Cone were used to verify
detectability of impact damage. These 3” x 3” coupons had been impacted by a cylindrical,
round faced impacter at 3.3, 8.8, 5.2, and 6.6 ft lb of energy. Several other coupons were
available that contained high energy impacted zones but were not used. The damage zones in the
coupons were easily detected with the TWI thermography system. The impact at the 3.3 ft lb
level specimen resulted in a barely visually detectable indention on the front surface. The
damage zone on this specimen was measured by the Thermography system to be 0.49” on the
front and 0.94” on the back in diameter.
The coupons were inspected at different distances and up to a 60 degree angle to the normal and
all damage zones were detectable.
Initial acceptance of the Nose Cone was with thermography using an Inframetrics 760 camera.
A set of heat lamps is positioned at 90 degrees to the Nose Cone with the Cone attached to a
turntable. The Cone is rotated at about 1 rpm. This is somewhat equivalent to flash
thermography. The Inframetrics 760 camera is a scanning system with a single Mercury
Cadmium Telluride detector. The thermal sensivity is 0.1 degree K detecting 8 - 12 micro meter
infrared light.
Nose Cone is 18 plies thick at bottom, 24 plies thick at top, about 1/4 inches thick.
On Pressurization Line Fairing
Material is graphite epoxy. 6 to 10 plies thick. The part is approximately 12” long by 6” wide by
6” high.
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Inspected April 12, 2007 with hand scanned ultrasonics, with 5 MHz, 0.25” transducer by Carl
Bouvier (LM MAF). Inspection was operated in pulse-echo mode off the back-surface using
water squirter-bottle to control coupling.
A defect standard of a fairing containing Teflon inserts was used to tune pulser/receiver. Set up
with back surface Teflon inserts at 80% of full screen height (FCH). The base noise level is less
than 10% FSH.
No grid was used, just hand raster scan. The scan was done twice. The part was at head height
when standing on small stool. Access to the part was unrestricted. The part flange could not be
inspected because of interference of attachment bolts.
Inspection was witnessed by Ricky Clements (MSFC) and James Walker (MSFC).
Manufacturer used hand scan ultrasonic inspection for acceptance. Critical initial defect is '/4” x
'/4”.
On Intertank Access Door
Material is graphite epoxy, skin stiffened with bonded hat shaped vertical stringers.
Inspected April 12 2007 with hand scanned ultrasonics, with 5 MHz, 0.25” transducer by Carl
Bouvier (LM MAF). Inspection was operated in pulse-echo mode off back-surface using water
squirter-bottle to control coupling.
A defect standard of a section of door containing Teflon inserts was used to tune pulser/receiver.
Set up with back surface Teflon inserts at 80% of full screen height (FCH). Noise level is
unknown.
No grid was used, just hand raster scan. The scan was done twice. Part was at knee to shoulder
height.
Inspection was witnessed by Ricky Clements (MSFC) and James Walker (MSFC).
Manufacturer used C-scan ultrasonic inspection for acceptance. Critical initial defect is '/4” x '/4”.
Telecom with Bobby Biggs (LM) on May 14, 2007
Discussion was on the development program for the Composite ET Nose Cone.
A damage tolerance program was used to satisfy fracture control requirements.
Flat coupon tests examined different types of damage. Impact was found to be the most
significant damage in effecting compression strength.
A 20 ft-lb impact with 1/2” diameter cylindrical impacter was found to cause barely visible
damage.
Compression tests of coupons were conducted from -320 to 800 degrees F. The trend was for the
impact to affect the compression property the same for all temperatures.
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Full scale testing was conducted on cone with four 20 ft-lb impacts located in critical areas. This
cone was tested to simulated loads for four flights lives and more than 3 times the maximum
flight load once with no damage growth measured by ultrasonic inspection.
A 20 ft-lb impact caused 2.5” diameter damage zone in coupons and 1” to 2” diameter damage
zone in the full scale cone.
1” by 1” critical defect size was developed from the damage tolerance program.
May 17, 2007
Sam Russell, Ph.D., P.E., ASNT LIII in UT, RT
256 544 4411
Nondestructive Evaluation Team, EM20
NASA MSFC
Huntsville, AL 35812
NESC Request No.: NESC 07-005-E
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources,
gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this
collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and
Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person
shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (From - To)
01- 08 - 2009 Technical Memorandum March 2007 - May 2007
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Space Transportation System (STS)-117 External Tank (ET)-124 Hail
Damage Repair Assessment 5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
Wilson, Timmy R.; Gentz, Steven J.; Barth, Timothy S.; Minute, Stephen
A.; Flowers, Cody P.; Hamilton, David A.; Martin, Fred W.; Ungar, 5e. TASK NUMBER
Eugene K.; Null, Cynthia H.; Schafer, Charles F.
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
869021.05.07.02.99
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
NASA Langley Research Center REPORT NUMBER
Hampton, VA 23681-2199
L-19733 NESC-RP-07-47/07-005-E
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)







Subject Category 16-Space Transportation and Safety
Availability: NASA CASI (443) 757-5802
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT
Severe thunderstorms with associated hail and high winds struck the STS-117 stack on February 26, 2007. Peak winds were recorded at 62
knots with hail sizes ranging from 0.3 inch to 0.8 inch in diameter. As a result of the storm, the North Carolina Foam Institute (NCFI) type
24-124 Thermal Protection System (TPS) foam on the liquid oxygen (LO2) ogive acreage incurred significant impact damage. The NCFI on
the ET intertank and the liquid hydrogen (LH2) acreage sustained hail damage. The Polymer Development Laboratory (PDL)-1034 foam of
the LO2 ice frost ramps (IFRs) and the Super-Lightweight Ablator (SLA) of the LO2 cable tray also suffered minor damage. NASA
Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was asked to assess the technical feasibility of repairing the ET TPS, the reasonableness of
conducting those repairs with the vehicle in a vertical, integrated configuration at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Vehicle Assemble
Building (VAB), and to address attendant human factors considerations including worker fatigue and the potential for error. The outcome of
the assessment is recorded in this document.
15. SUBJECT TERMS
External Tank; Ice Frost Ramps; Intertank; NESC; SURFICE
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
ABSTRACT OF
PAGES STI Hel Desk email: hel	 sti.nasa. ovp	 (	 p@	 g	 )a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)
U U U UU 118 (443) 757-5802
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
